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THIS  ARTICLE  is the second of two complementary papers by the authors 
concerning inflation accounting and nonfinancial corporate profits. The 
companion piece, which appeared in BPEA, 3:1975, discussed definitions 
of  real corporate profits and suggested as  a meaningful and attractive 
candidate the accrual of purchasing power by equity holders. A  second 
definition, based on the concept of maintaining capital intact, was pre- 
sented as an alternative. The paper asserted that each balance-sheet entry 
warrants restatement relative to current practice in order to compute real 
profits and provide an accurate detailed picture of the position of the firm 
in periods of inflation and of adjustment in relative prices. The accounting 
treatment of inventories and depreciable  assets was examined in detail, and 
micro and macro estimates were made of the impact of adopting account- 
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ing practices  consistent  with  the two definitions  of real  income  for  balance- 
sheet  entries  involving  physical  assets.  This paper,  on the other  hand,  will 
examine  the accounting  practices  for nominally  denominated  financial  as- 
sets and liabilities.  It also will aggregate  and summarize  the results  of the 
two papers. 
We take corporate  income  (profits)  as a measure  of the increase  in the 
"economic  power"  of the equity  holders  of the firm.  To be fully  consistent 
with a Haig-Simons  accrual  definition  of income, as we argued  in our 
previous  study, depreciable  assets and inventories  should be carried  on 
balance  sheets  at their  current  market  value.  Further,  any  real  appreciation 
or depreciation  of these  assets  relative  to the general  price  level should  be 
computed  as income.  This policy had to be compromised  somewhat  due 
to the paucity  of data and the inadequacies  of the available  price  indexes 
for specific capital goods. In  practice, we  recommend  general-value 
depreciation  and constant-dollar  FIFO (first  in, first out) inventory  ac- 
counting,  and estimated  the impact of implementing  them. We demon- 
strated  that  the universal  adoption  of these  techniques  would  reduce  aggre- 
gate profits, and therefore  profit taxes, of nonfinancial  corporations  in 
the presence  of inflation.  However,  the two policies  would  affect  individual 
companies  represented  in the Dow Jones industrial  averages  very dif- 
ferently. 
The earlier  paper also asserted  that the definition  of income  based on 
capital maintenance  conceptually  suggested very different accounting 
procedures  than did the definition  based on purchasing-power  accrual. 
If one accepts  the idea of capital  maintenance,  the relative  appreciation 
of depreciable  assets  and  inventories  does  not constitute  income.  It follows 
that  LIFO  (last  in, first  out)  would  be the  appropriate  inventory-accounting 
technique  to implement  the capital-maintenance  income  concept. 
The  Accounting  Treatment  of Financial  Liabilities 
We open  this analysis  of financial  assets  and liabilities  by concentrating 
on the accounting  for liabilities. 
The Haig-Simons,  or purchasing-power-accrual,  concept of corporate 
income  requires  recording  all assets and liabilities,  physical  or financial, 
at their  market  values  in order  to determine  changes  in net worth.  Further, 
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real value of  each entry) demands stating the balance-sheet figures for 
the beginning and the end of the year in the same units. We have adopted 
the year-end doliar as the appropriate unit and are using the domestic- 
spending 'deflator (covering  GNP  minus  exports plus  imports)  as  the 
measure of the change in the purchasing power of the dollar. 
The capital-maintenance  definition of income is briefly summarized by 
Pigou: 
From the joint work of the whole mass of productive  factors there comes an 
(annual)  in-flowing  stream  of output. This is gross real income. When what is 
required  to maintain  capital  intact is subtracted  from this there is left net real 
income.' 
This  definition makes  absolutely  no  reference to  financial  liabilities. 
One could argue that, to be consistent with the accounting treatment of 
physical assets under this  concept,  the  firm's short position  on  bonds 
should be handled with a LIFO-type procedure. This follows the "going 
concern" assumption of accountants and its basic emphasis on realization. 
It implies that accrued changes in the market value  of  bond liabilities 
would not enter the computation of income. A possible justification for 
this treatment is that the firm issued its liabilities with their particular 
coupon rates and maturity structure  because it desired the implied periodi- 
zation of nominal debt costs and had no intention of repurchasing pre- 
maturely in the event of rising interest rates. The argument is that the 
firm is in  the business of  selling, not  buying, such long-term financial 
contracts as bonds. This position conflicts with the fact that many firms 
do  buy  out their debt at  discount. Again,  as with physical assets, the 
fundamental issue is whether an accrued but unrealized gain should be 
recorded as income. 
While capital-maintenance income,  on  this interpretation, would  not 
reflect changes in the market value of long-term liabilities, it would include 
the decrease in the real burden of nominal net liabilities that accompanies 
inflation. This correction, which amounts to deducting as costs only real, 
not  nominal, interest payments would  be  made with both  real-income 
concepts and is part of the reform of corporate accounting proposed by the 
Financial Accounting Standards  Board (FASB).2  The only difference  is that 
1. A. C. Pigou, "Maintaining  Capital  Intact,"  Economica,  n.s., vol. 8 (August 1941), 
p. 271. 
2. FASB, Proposed  Statement  of Financial  Accounting  Standards  (Exposure  Draft), 
"Financial  Reporting in Units of General Purchasing  Power" (December 31, 1974; 
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with the purchasing-power-accrual  concept,  a firm's  net liability  position 
would  be determined  using  market  values,  while  with the capital-mainte- 
nance  concept  or the FASB proposal,  book values  would  be used. 
Present  accounting  practices  for financial  liabilities  in the income  state- 
ment  of nonfinancial  corporations  are  based  on simple  cash  flow.  The only 
reporting  with respect  to retained  liabilities  is the deduction  of nominal 
interest  paid.  Thus,  the treatment  is not consistent  with either  of the two 
real-income  concepts  we have  presented,  and,  in particular,  differs  from  the 
Haig-Simons  concept in two major respects.  First, such entries  are not 
corrected  to their current  or market  value but are listed at their  issue or 
maturity  price.  Second,  no adjustment  is made  for the decline  in the value 
of a firm's  real  liabilities  that results  from any decrease  in the purchasing 
power  of a dollar  even  if their  nominal  value  remains  constant.  The  follow- 
ing paragraphs  report estimates  of the effects of these two accounting 
changes  on the thirty  Dow Jones  industrial  companies  and  on nonfinancial 
corporations  in the aggregate. 
CORRECTING  BONDS TO NOMINAL MARK  VALUE 
In recent  years  not only  has the rate of inflation  increased  substantially, 
but so has the expectation  of future  inflation,  as reflected  in movements 
in long-term  interest  rates.  These changes  have precipitated  a large drop 
in the  market  price  of many  long-term  bonds.  The  owners  have  experienced 
a loss, which  they can realize  by selling  their  bonds in the market.  Essen- 
tially,  bond holders  can trade  bonds among  themselves  in order  to realize 
the losses and obtain the resulting  tax deductions.  Against  these losses, 
no profit  is reported  for tax or financial-statement  purposes.  Nonetheless, 
under  the accrual  concept,  the bond issuer  enjoys  a symmetric  economic 
profit  when the nominal  value of its debt obligations  declines  due to an 
increase  in interest  rates.  Consider  a bond  whose  value  was $1,000  at issue, 
but has fallen to $800 by the end of one year.  The company  has made a 
$200 gain in the sense that it can buy this obligation  in the open market 
for $800.3  To be consistent  with an accrual  definition  of profit,  we would 
argue,  the income  of the firm  should  be independent  of realization.4  This 
can be accomplished  if companies  carry  their  marketable  long-term  debt 
obligations  (and  long-term  financial  assets)  at market  value  on their  balance 
3. The same effect  can be achieved  by buying  a similar  bond of another  company. 
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sheets, and report the change in market value as income.' Liabilities that 
are not  traded on  active markets would be  carried at their calculated 
present values; the discounting would be determined using the interest rate 
the firm faces on similar marketable debt issues. 
Two  aspects of  this proposal should be clarified. First, it may  seem 
paradoxical for the case of a fall in bond values due to a perceived deepen- 
ing of default risk. Such a change may correspond to a decrease in value 
of the assets of the firm that clearly makes the equity holders worse off, 
and which, under the purchasing-power-accrual  concept of income, would 
be reported as a loss. However, to the extent that the greater risk of bank- 
ruptcy depreciates the value of the bond liabilities, some  of this loss is 
transferred from the  equity holders to  the  bond  holders. As  a  result, 
stockholders realize a partially offsetting gain, which would be recorded 
as accrual income with the procedures described in this section. 
Second, as with depreciation and inventory accounting, market-value 
reporting of financial liabilities involves the timing of income (and pre- 
sumably tax payments). If the bond is not repurchased prematurely, its 
price will return to  100 (percent of issue price).6 The net change in value 
will be zero, and the tax payments over the life of the bond will be the 
same with  or without market-value reporting. Firms offer many bond 
issues, some with rather long  maturities, and the empirical data to  be 
presented will show that the long run is long enough that the adoption of 
market-value statements would have a sizable effect on earnings. 
As has already been stated, firms do not now revise the value of their 
outstanding liabilities to  the  market level.  In  terms  of  present value, 
this  omission is  compensated for by the  deduction of  interest expense 
according to the historical coupon rate and not the market rate, but the 
timing of  reported income diverges from that  of  the  actual accrual of 
economic power. To clarify this phenomenon, consider a firm that issues 
a ten-year, $10,000 bond at 4 percent interest. If interest rates jump to 
10 percent immediately after the bond is issued, its market value falls to 
$6,313. If the company does not repurchase this obligation, current ac- 
counting practice would have it report $400 annual interest expense on 
5. A similar  proposal  for accounting  in the financial  sector is contained  in George J. 
Staubus, "Current  Value Accounting in  Financial Industries"  (lecture delivered at 
University  of California,  Berkeley,  November 18, 1974; available  as a pamphlet  from 
University  of California,  Berkeley,  Institute  of Business  and Economic  Research). 
6. Bonds that never  mature,  termed  consols, need not return  to par, however. 20  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1976 
a  $10,000 loan,  $600 less  interest than what would be required at the 
market rate. With a  10 percent discount rate, the present value of this 
$600 annual "saving" for the next ten years is $3,687, exactly the amount 
of the drop in market value. Thus, the gain is spread over the life of the 
obligation.  With  market-value accounting,  a  $3,687  profit  would  be 
recorded when the spurt in the interest rate occurred. If the  10 percent 
rate persists, the value of the bond would be $6,544 after one year and 
$6,798  after two. Following  the extraordinary  (one-shot)  gain of $3,687, 
the firm  would report $400 in interest  and a $231 rise in obligations  the 
first year (for a total of $631, or 10 percent  of $6,313),  and $400 plus 
a $254  increase  in obligations  during  the second  year.  The total debt cost 
would always  be consistent  with the market  interest  rate and the market 
value of the debt, and the profits  or losses due to interest-rate  changes 
would be reported  when they were experienced.  Proponents  of accrual 
accounting  would argue that these calculations  more accurately  reflect 
the income  flows  and economic  position  of the business  enterprise. 
Table 1 details  the unreported  and unrealized  profits  that each of the 
Dow Jones industrial  companies  experienced  in 1974 on its outstanding 
bonds. The double  column 1 records  the value of the open-market  bonds 
outstanding  for each company  in 1973 and 1974. Column  2 shows the 
net bond-market  borrowing  by each company  during 1974. The figure 
is positive  if the company  issued  more debt than it repaid,  and negative 
in the opposite case. The net gain on open-market  bonds is shown in 
column  3; a similar  figure  for closely held, foreign, and nonlisted  long- 
term obligations  is shown in column 4, but it is approximate  since the 
present  value of these  items had to be estimated  given  their  maturity  and 
coupon  rate, the credit  rating  of the company,  and market  interest  rates. 
No adjustment  was made  for the exchange-rate  income  or loss from  hold- 
ing  foreign-currency  obligations.  The  total  unreported  profits  of these  firms 
resulting  from the decreases  in the market  or present  value of their  long- 
term obligations  is given in column  5, while the corresponding  numbers 
for unconsolidated  credit-company  subsidiaries  are shown in footnote c 
of the  table.7  The  table  indicates  that  all of the  Dow companies  experienced 
unreported  profits  on their  bonds in 1974,  with American  Telephone  and 
Telegraph  and  its consolidated  subsidiaries  accounting  for more  than one- 
7. The numbers  for Chrysler's  credit subsidiary  and Westinghouse  and its uncon- 
solidated subsidiary  are swollen somewhat because investors apparently  felt that the 
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half of the total gain of $3.3 billion. The income corrections that would be 
made by individual companies to arrive at the accrual of purchasing power 
depend primarily on the amount and maturity structure of the firm's out- 
standing debt. These elements determine the sensitivity of  the value of 
total liabilities to interest-rate  changes. 
The corresponding macro time-series data on changes in the market or 
present value  of  long-term liabilities are contained in  tables  2  and  3. 
These tables report calculations of the accrued but unrealized profit that 
nonfinancial corporations have experienced on their long-term bond and 
mortgage liabilities from 1945 to  1974. Column 2 of table 2 indicates that 
at the end of 1974 the average bond was sefling at 76 percent of its price 
at issue. The difference between the par and market value of  bonds is 
shown in column 4; as of December 31, 1974, the total value of the out- 
standing bonds of nonfinancial corporations was $53.7 billion less than 
their combined issue (par) value. This number represents the cumulative 
accrued gain of  bond  issuers and the symmetric loss  of  bond  holders. 
Because this statistic would tend toward zero with stable interest rates, 
it is rather remarkable that it has remained positive for the twenty-nine 
years 1946-74. At  no  time during that period was the average market 
price of bonds above par. The year-to-year change in gains is shown in 
column 5 and should be interpreted as the year's decrease in the market 
value  of  outstanding bonds.  These numbers, then,  are the  annual un- 
reported profits of nonfinancial corporations due to changes in the value 
of bond liabilities. The severe credit crunches of 1966, 1969, and 1973-74, 
which resulted in sharply higher interest rates and lower bond prices, show 
up clearly in this column. 
Table 3 sets out the similar gain that nonfinancial corporations have 
enjoyed on their mortgage liabilities. A substantial fraction of these entries 
are reported by real estate companies, and in aggregate they are slightly 
over half as important as long-term bonds. We have assumed that the 
average ratio of present to par value for these obligations is the same as 
that observed for  marketable bonds.  This  assumption implies  that  the 
longer average maturity of mortgages exactly balances the fact that the 
principal is gradually paid off during the term of the liability. If one com- 
bines the results of the two tables, the 1974 figures are $84.7 billion and 
$37.9 billion, respectively, for cumulative and annual gains on bond and 
mortgage valuation. 
One result of  the  current accounting practice should  be  mentioned. e.Zt1  -1  -  -  )  Q  o  ei 
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-4)-.-  ~~~~~~uU  ci Table 2.  Unrealized  Gain on Long-Term  Bonds, Nonfinancial  Corporations, 
1945-74 
Aggregates  in billions of dollars 
Market 
value  of 
Par value  Average  out-  Cumulative  Year's 
of out-  end-of-year  standing  unrealized  accrued 
standing  bonds  price  bonds  gain  gain 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1945  23.5  101.25  23.8  -0.3 
1946  24.4  95.13  23.2  1.2  1.5 
1947  27.2  89.53  24.4  2.8  1.6 
1948  31.4  93.22  29.3  2.1  -0.7 
1949  34.2  97.08  33.2  1.0  -1.1 
1950  35.7  99.50  35.5  0.2  -0.8 
1951  38.9  93.16  36.2  2.7  2.5 
1952  43.6  96.20  41.9  1.7  -1.0 
1953  47.0  95.21  44.7  2.3  0.6 
1954  50.4  99.50  50.1  0.3  -2.0 
1955  53.3  97.76  52.1  1.2  0.9 
1956  56.9  87.40  49.7  7.2  6.0 
1957  63.2  88.09  55.7  7.5  0.3 
1958  68.9  89.06  61.4  7.5  0.0 
1959  71.9  83.77  60.2  11.7  4.2 
1960  75.3  86.41  65.1  10.2  -1.5 
1961  80.0  88.13  70.5  9.5  -0.7 
1962  84.5  90.22  76.2  8.3  -1.2 
1963  88.4  90.45  80.0  8.5  0.2 
1964  92.4  92.31  85.3  7.1  -1.4 
1965  97.8  91.32  89.3  8.5  1.4 
1966  108.0  84.40  91.2  16.8  8.3 
1967  122.7  82.07  100.7  22.0  5.2 
1968  135.6  82.25  111.5  24.1  2.1 
1969  147.6  72.12  106.4  41.2  17.1 
1970  167.3  80.78  135.1  32.2  -9.0 
1971  186.1  89.93  167.3  18.8  -13.4 
1972  198.3  91.48  181.4  16.9  -1.9 
1973  207.5  85.71  177.9  29.6  12.7 
1974  227.2  76.35  173.5  53.7  24.1 
Sources: Column 1, three releases  from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Systemn-1945-64, 
"Flow of Funds Accounts, 1945-1972" (1973; processed), pp. 85-86;  1965-73, "Flow of Funds Accounts, 
1965-1973" (1974; processed), p. 30; and 1974, "Flow of Funds, Seasonally Adjusted, 1st Quarter, 1975, 
Preliminary"  (May 9, 1975; processed), p. 6. 
Column 2, 1945-58, obtained from the New York Stock Exchange, Department of Research and Statis- 
tics;  1959-74, New  York Stock Exchange, New  York Stock Exchange Fact Book, 1960 (1960), "Listed 
Bonds at the End of 1959-By  Major Groups," and the same table in subsequent issues. 
Column 3 is the product of columns 1 and 2 divided by 100; column 4 is column 1 minus column 3; 
column 5 is the difference  between values of current  and preceding year in columnn  4. 
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Table 3.  Unrealized Gains on Mortgage Liabilities, Nonfinancial Corpora- 
tions, 1945-74 
Billions  of dollars 
Present  Cumulative  Year's 
Par value  value  of  unirealized  accrued 
of mortgages  mortgages  gain  gain 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1945  8.5  8.6  -0.1  ... 
1946  10.0  9.5  0.5  0.6 
1947  11.6  10.4  1.2  0.7 
1948  12.7  11.8  0.9  -0.3 
1949  13.5  13.1  0.4  -0.5 
1950  14.4  14.3  0.1  -0.3 
1951  15.2  14.2  1.0  0.9 
1952  16.1  15.5  0.6  -0.4 
1953  16.9  16.1  0.8  0.2 
1954  18.5  18.4  0.1  -0.7 
1955  20.3  19.8  0.5  0.4 
1956  22.0  19.2  2.8  2.3 
1957  23.6  20.7  2.9  0.1 
1958  26.5  23.6  2.9  0.0 
1959  29.5  24.7  4.8  1.9 
1960  32.0  27.7  4.3  -0.5 
1961  36.0  31.7  4.3  -0.0 
1962  40.5  36.5  4.0  -0.3 
1963  45.4  41.1  4.3  0.3 
1964  49.0  45.2  3.8  -0.5 
1965  52.8  48.2  4.6  0.8 
1966  57.1  48.2  8.9  4.3 
1967  61.6  50.6  11.0  2.1 
1968  67.2  55.3  11.9  0.9 
1969  71.8  51.8  20.0  8.1 
1970  77.0  62.2  14.8  -5.2 
1971  88.5  79.6  8.9  -5.9 
1972  104.1  95.3  8.8  -0.1 
1973  120.2  103.0  17.2  8.4 
1974  131.1  100.1  31.0  13.8 
Sources: Column 1, same as table 2, column 1; column 2 is the product of column 1 and table 2, column 
2, divided by 100; column 3 is colunn  1 minus coluinn 2; column 4 is the difference between values of 
current  and preceding  year in columnn  3. Figures are rounded. 26  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1976 
Any portion of cumulative  unreported  and unrealized  profits on long- 
term financial  liabilities  that management  chooses to realize  will be re- 
ported  as income;  the remainder  will not. This large pool of potentially 
realizable  profits  thus  provides  a major  opportunity  for income  smoothing. 
That many companies  seize the opportunity  is easily documented.8  We 
argue  that it is better  to record  income  as it accrues  and then to provide 
the desired  smoothing  or averaging  in the interpretation  or taxation  of the 
resulting  profits. 
REAL PROFIT  ON NET FINANCIAL LIABILITIES 
One more necessary  correction  is to express  financial  assets and lia- 
bilities (and the change in their value) in constant dollars. To ensure 
against  double  counting  among  these  adjustments,  reconsider  the example 
of a bond  that  sold a year  ago for $1,000  but now  is valued  at $800  because 
long-term  interest  rates  have risen.  We have  just argued  that the firm  has 
experienced  a $200 profit, which we would have it report by reducing 
liabilities  by that  much.  However,  if there  has been,  say, 10  percent  general 
inflation  during  the year,  the firm  also has gained  because  its obligations 
are in nominal  terms.  While it now has a liability  of $800, it previously 
had a real debt of $1,100  expressed  in current  dollars.  This extra $100  in 
unreported  income  is the traditional  inflationary  gain of holders  of nomi- 
nally denominated  liabilities.  As we have already  stated, while the $200 
correction  would  not be considered  income  under  the capital-maintenance 
approach,  the $100 "debtor"  profit would be recorded  with either  real- 
income  measure. 
The financial  assets and liabilities  of the Dow Jones industrials  at the 
end of the 1973  fiscal  year are shown  in table 4. Unlike the previous  two 
tables, this one includes  both short-  and long-term  financial  contracts. 
Columns  1 and 2 display  the book value  of financial  assets  and liabilities, 
respectively,  while column 3 shows the net liability  position of the firm 
using  these  book valuations.  Twenty-eight  of the thirty  firms  had positive 
net financial  liabilities.  Column  4 contains  the decreases  in the real value 
of the firm's net liabilities  (calculated  at book value). These numbers 
would be added to real nonfinancial  corporate  profits for 1974 under 
the capital-maintenance  definition  of income. 
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To calculate  the corresponding  income  adjustments  for the purchasing- 
power-accrual  approach  requires  determining  the net financial-liability 
position at market  values. Most of the financial  assets of nonfinancial 
corporations  are cash, deposits  with very short  terms,  and Treasury  bills. 
The only major  exceptions  are financial  leases and pension-fund  assets, 
which are not included  in these data but which will be discussed  in the 
appendix.  Therefore,  we are assuming  that the values of the financial 
assets given in table 4 do not deviate from book. As we noted above, 
financial  liabilities  do deviate,  and  column  5 records  the difference  between 
book and market  for these balance-sheet  entries.  The 1973  net liabilities, 
at market  values,  are given  in column  7. The figures  are in 1973  dollars, 
however,  and the same inflation  adjustment  made for the book figures 
is necessary  for comparability  with the 1974  balance-sheet  entries  and for 
determination  of changes  in real financial  position. The inflation  gains 
resulting  from the net liability  position at 1973  market  value are shown 
in column  8; these  are the real inflation  gains of the firm  arising  from  its 
net holdings  of nominally  denominated  debt. To derive  accrued  income 
in constant  dollars  for these companies,  these  figures  and the decrease  in 
the market  value of long-term  financial  liabilities  should be added to 
reported  earnings.  As with the market-value  correction,  American  Tele- 
phone and Telegraph  displays by far the largest correction,  this time 
amounting  to $3.26  billion, or 61 percent  of the total for the thirty  com- 
panies.  The  importance  of the total correction  of $5.3  billion  (and  the $3.3 
billion  market-value  adjustment  of table 1) may be more easily gauged  if 
it is compared  to the total reported  net income  of $16 billion  for the Dow 
companies.  Again,  the gain  on nominal  net liabilities  is very  uneven  among 
these  firms.  In general,  the  figures  are  larger  if book  values  are  used  (capital- 
maintenance  approach)  than if market  and present  values  determine  net 
liabilities. 
The corresponding  macro  time-series  data  for the postwar  period,  given 
in table 5, indicate  that the gains due to the net-debtor  status of non- 
financial  corporations  have grown  enormously  in recent  years.  While  our 
other  income  corrections  have also surged  of late, in this case the effect 
has been magnified  by the simultaneous  rapid  increases  in net liabilities 
of nonfinancial  corporations  and in the rate of inflation.  With market 
values,  the real  profit  on nominal  net liabilities  in 1974  amounts  to $26.2 
billion (shown  in column 8), compared  with slightly  less than $1 billion 
in 1964. This enormous  gain can be separated  into the increase  in net '  c  WJ  el  st  o  00 0  N  0  N  C4  ' V-  0  O' 
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liabilities (which accounts for about one-third) and the jump in the rate of 
inflation, accounting for the remaining two-thirds. The figures on book 
value of net liabilities and inflation gains, which would be used with a 
capital-maintenance  definition, are even larger (compare columns 4 and 8). 
In fact, the macro numbers  involved with either constant-dollar adjustment 
were trivial prior to  1966. But the  1974 corrections of  $26.2 billion  or 
$31.9 billion amount to 40 or 49 percent of the net earnings of $64.5 billion 
of nonfinancial corporations. 
The  magnitudes of  these  corrections to  corporate earnings are too 
large to be ignored. Both the market-value and the net-debtor adjustments 
involve tens of billions of dollars and substantial percentages of reported 
net earnings. Both changes would bring the definition of corporate income 
closer to a broad Haig-Simons concept of the accrual of economic power. 
The two corrections are of similar magnitude, and the net-debtor adjust- 
ment would be appropriate even if one accepts the capital-maintenance 
concept. As neither of the inflation corrections seems difficult to accom- 
plish, we favor adopting an appropriate definition of  income and then 
modifying accounting practice so  as  to  record this  income  as  exactly 
as possible. 
Summing  Up the Adjustments  to Nonfinancial  Corporate Income 
We have presented in this and the previous paper numerical estimates 
of the impact of adopting accounting practices consistent with the defini- 
tion of nonfinancial corporate income based on purchasing-power  accrual 
(omitting pension funds and leases, discussed in the appendix). We also 
have shown most of the estimates corresponding  to the capital-maintenance 
concept. This section, then, will aggregate the estimates of this paper with 
those of the earlier one, both to  offer a picture of the overall effect of 
implementing a consistent set of  accounting procedures that adjust for 
inflation and to  facilitate comparisons of the importance of the various 
adjustments. Before examining the components and the totals, we again 
emphasize that the estimates of these adjustments are only approximate 
and that the corrections for pension  funds and leases discussed in the 
appendix may  be  important, if  unavoidable,  omissions.  Both  of  these 
qualifications  arise because a fully detailed financial picture of nonfinancial 
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to paint from the information in their published reports. But these diffi- 
culties are not  inherent. The accountants of  the  companies themselves 
could  give a more accurate appraisal of the impact of  such policies as 
general-value depreciation, constant-dollar FIFO, and both market-value 
and constant-dollar reporting of financial assets and liabilities. Despite 
these disclaimers, we believe that our data give an accurate qualitative 
picture  of  the  importance of  the  various  accounting  adjustments for 
inflation that we have analyzed and proposed. 
ADJUSTMENTS  TO THE DOW THIRTY 
The impacts of these accounting changes for 1974 are shown in table 6. 
Two columns may need explanation. First, in column 4, which records the 
deferred federal and state taxes for each company, the numbers largely 
represent the  difference between  tax  (accelerated) and  book  (usually 
straight-line) depreciation. As  we  argued in  our  previous  paper,  this 
money will not be required to pay future taxes as long as the investment 
stream of the company does not decline in nominal terms. Because this 
is the likely situation for companies such as those included in the Dow 
thirty, we assert that they should "flow-through"  these deferred taxes into 
reported income; and we have included them in the total income adjust- 
ments (column 10). As with most of our corrections, deferred U.S.  taxes 
are largest for American Telephone and Telegraph. While its annual report 
shows federal and state income taxes  of  $2.04 billion,  the  actual cash 
liability for taxes associated with 1974 earnings amounted to  only  $777 
million. The remainder  is deferred, and in all likelihood will never be paid. 
Obviously, to the extent deferred taxes do "come due" and thus increase 
the  present value  of  future tax  liabilities,  we  have  overstated profits. 
Column 9 also requires  some explanation. Income statements are supposed 
to record the financial flows of corporations. Nonetheless, they are com- 
piled only periodically, with complete statements produced usually only 
once a year. Column 9 simply adjusts all of the dividend payments of 1974 
to year-end dollars (using the spending deflator) to make them consistent 
with our other magnitudes. 
The total adjustments for the Dow  thirty in aggregate are $7.4 billion 
for 1974, or some 46 percent of their total reported net income. The largest 
single correction is the more than $5 billion in unreported profits due to 
the net-debtor status of these firms (calculated using market values), but Table 6.  Accounting  Adjustments  Necessary to Arrive  at Real Haig-Simons 
Millions  of dollars, except as noted 
Income  U.S.  U.S. 
before  federal  federal 
U.S.  and  and 
federal  state  state  Depre- 
Reported  and state  income  income  ciation 
net  income  taxes,  taxes,  adjust- 
incomea  taxes  current deferred  ment 
Company  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Allied  Chemical  150.8  216.9  46.2  19.9  -48.6 
Aluminum  Company  of America  173.1  262.8  76.4  13.3  -70.0 
American Brands  136.7  238.2  103.8  -2.3  -13.2 
American Can  95.1  165.6  62.8  7.7  -32.8 
American Telephone  and Telegraph  3,169.9  5,210.3  777.2  1,263.2  -1,401.2 
Anaconda  247.1  297.6  5.0  45.5  -33.9 
Bethlehem Steel  342.0  594.0  241.0  11.0  -99.3 
Chrysler  -52.1  -146.2  -156.3  62.2  -23.8 
E. I.  du Pont  de Nemours  403.5  642.1  202.6  36.0  -35.9 
Eastman Kodak  629.5  1,023.7  383.2  11.0  -11.8 
Esmark  68.1  120.8  57.2  -4.5  -15.4 
Exxon  3,142.2  3,792.2  623.0  27.0  -536.9 
General Electric  608.1  909.1  270.8  30.2  -115.1 
General Foods  99.4  129.3  60.7  -30.8  -16.2 
General Motors  950.1  1,558.0  330.3  277.6  -355.6 
Goodyear  Tire and Rubber  157.5  216.6  32.1  27.0  -61.1 
International  Harvester  124.1  178.9  43.2  11.6  -30.4 
International  Nickel  306.0  323.2  8.3  8.9  -36.0 
International  Paper  262.6  411.4  150.2  -1.4  -54.4 
Johns-Manville  71.9  79.1  3.8  3.4  -12.1 
Owens-Illinois  83.5  117.8  21.8  12.5  -28.0 
Procter and Gamble  316.7  515.9  182.3  16.9  -32.8 
Sears, Roebuck  679.9  966.9  189.0  98.0  -50.9 
Standard Oil of California  970.0  1,106.7  106.7  30.0  -191.6 
Texaco  1,586.4  1,675.7  58.5  30.8  -260.3 
Union  Carbide  530.1  708.1  160.2  17.8  -105.2 
U.S.  Steel  634.9  957.7  271.3  51.5  -201.9 
United  Technologies  104.7  206.9  99.1  3.1  -10.1 
Westinghouse  Electric  28.1  60.1  75.9  -43.9  -43.5 
F. W. Woolworth  64.8  71.2  7.2  -0.8  -19.6 
All companies  16,084.7  22,610.6  4,493.5  2,032.4  -3,947.6 
Sources: Columns 1, 2, 3, 4, form 10-K reports filed annually by the companies with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission; column 5 is the negative of column 3, table 1, in John B. Shoven anp Jeremy I. 
Bulow,  "Inflation Accounting and  Nonfinancial Corporate Profits: Physical Assets,"  BPEA,  3:1975; 
column 6 is from ibid., table 4, column 6; column 7 is from table 1 above, column 5; column 8 is from 
table 4 above, column 8; column 9 is dividends  paid throughout the year as reported on form 10-K, adjusted 
by the authors to state them in year-end dollars; column 10 is the sum of columns 4 through 9; column 11 
is the sum of columns 10 and 1; column 12 is the sum of current  and deferred  U.S. and foreign taxes divided Accrual Income, Thirty Dow Jones Industrials,  1974 
Adjustment 
Effect  of  Decrease  Gain  on  Tax rate 
constant-  in  net  Dividend  Total  Adjusted  (percent) 
dollar  bond  financial  adjust-  adjust-  U.S. 
FIFO  values  liabilities  ment  ments  profit  Apparent  Adjusted 
(6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
42.7  39.0  54.5  2.5  110.0  260.8  35.9  15.9 
97.7  83.1  93.1  2.7  219.9  393.0  41.3  16.9 
-57.8  21.5  89.6  4.1  41.9  178.6  51.2  38.0 
86.7  32.0  44.5  2.6  140.7  235.8  47.3  21.9 
-44.6  1,819.2  3,260.1  120.0  5,016.7  8,186.6  39.3  9.1 
27.1  24.1  18.1  1.3  -8.8b  238.3  17.3  2.1 
213.9  57.8  67.2  5.9  256.5  598.5  44.5  29.8 
-218.0  9.1  218.6  4.6  52.7  0.6  n.m.  n.m. 
255.1  18.1  3.8  16.1  293.2  696.7  41.9  23.5 
71.3  7.6  -82.2  18.9  14.8  644.3  45.5  38.5 
-41.8  10.3  33.6  0.8  -17.0  51.1  47.6  54.1 
325.2  208.5  187.3  65.8  276.9  3,419.1  71.3  16.1 
62.0  53.7  281.2  17.1  329.1  937.2  37.9  23.3 
-48.8  9.9  40.8  3.9  -41.2  58.2  40.2  52.4 
-625.7  44.8  61.1  58.1  -539.7  410.4  30.5  45.9 
50.1  83.5  118.9  4.3  222.7  380.2  27.2  8.2 
-155.8  48.9  110.3  2.6  -12.8  111.3  42.8  29.1 
-45.0  34.9  -2.7  7.0  -32.9  273.1  44.8  3.1 
-14.1  41.4  31.7  4.5  7.7  270.3  43.5  36.9 
-14.2  16.0  13.5  1.3  7.9  79.8  33.7  4.8 
1.3  40.1  41.1  1.5  68.5  152.0  41.2  13.1 
0.8  18.7  22.8  7.7  34.1  350.8  46.4  35.4 
-216.6  31.8  57.6  15.6  -64.5  615.4  30.9  24.5 
457.9  76.9  48.4  19.2  440.8  1,410.8  44.7  7.4 
215.7  149.9  152.0  33.6  321.7  1,908.1  45.7  3.1 
68.0  47.9  55.2  7.8  91.5  621.6  41.6  21.4 
125.4  89.2  113.3  7.0  184.5  819.4  39.1  25.9 
-49.7  28.9  26.9  1.6  0.7  105.4  48.0  49.8 
-114.5  92.4  78.3  5.0  -26.2  1.9  69.5  98.0 
-94.1  66.4  83.2  2.1  37.2  102.0  43.7  6.9 
360.2  3,305.6  5,321.8  445.2  7,426.6  23,511.3  51.0?  16.8 
by the sum of those taxes plus reported net income; column 13 is current U.S. taxes adjusted to year-end 
dollars divided by those taxes plus adjusted U.S. profits (column 11). 
a.  Includes the following extraordinary  items: American Can, 5.1; Anaconda, 140.4; Eastman Kodac, 
-9.4;  General Foods,  -21.4;  International  Harvester, 6.1; Johns-Manville, 21,3, 
b.  Net of $91 million adjustment  in timing of expropriation  loss, 
c.  Rate is 40.8 percent if Exxon Corporation  is excluded, 
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the other adjustments are also extremely significant. For instance, these 
companies underdepreciate  (and therefore exaggerate earnings) for book 
purposes by some $3.9 billion, comparing straight-line general-value and 
the present original-cost book  depreciation methods. At the same time, 
they  report approximately $2.5  billion  more  depreciation to  the  IRS 
than to their stockholders (by using accelerated techniques for tax pur- 
poses),  reducing their tax  bill  by  about  $1.2  billion.  Requiring these 
companies to use general-value straight-line depreciation in the presence 
of  the current corporate tax system would cause a modest  decrease in 
their total tax obligations (by some $0.6 billion) and a large decrease in 
earnings reported for  book  purposes  (approximately  $3.3  billion).  In 
table 6, however, we have assumed that the tax bill would remain constant 
after all our changes, with the tax rules and rates adjusted as necessary 
to accomplish this. 
Table 6 also reveals that the Dow  companies experienced $3.3 billion 
in unreported gains in 1974 due to the decline in the value of their long- 
term liabilities (column 7). While this number dwarfs the aggregate effect 
of  switching to  constant-dollar FIFO  (column  6),  for many individual 
firms the latter correction is the more important. In general, the oil com- 
panies that used LIFO had the largest unreported real inventory gains; 
hence, their earnings would show the greatest increase under a switch to 
constant-dollar  FIFO. The firms  that are already  using FIFO-type account- 
ing, such as General Motors, Chrysler,  International Harvester, and Sears, 
Roebuck, would experience the largest decline due to the constant-dollar 
correction. 
The final two columns of table 6 display the apparent tax rate and our 
adjusted tax rate for each of the Dow  firms in  1974. The apparent total 
rate is that which a casual reader of annual reports would infer and equals 
reported taxes (including U.S.  and foreign taxes, both paid and deferred) 
divided by those taxes plus reported net income (column 1). The contrast- 
ing adjusted U.S. tax rate of column 13 equals current  U.S. taxes (column 3 
of  the  table  adjusted to  year-end dollars) divided by  these  taxes plus 
adjusted U.S.  profits (column  11). The adjusted U.S.  tax rate is a good 
measure of the rate facing a firm that earns most  of its income in the 
United States; of course, it understates the total tax burden of companies 
that pay large foreign income taxes.9 The adjusted U.S.  tax rate for the 
9. While, for example,  International  Nickel pays very little U.S. income tax, it pays 
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thirty companies combined (16.8 percent) is  startlingly lower  than the 
apparent total tax rate of  51 percent. One reason is that  our adjusted 
figure for the U.S. profits of these companies is substantially higher than 
their reported net  income.  Another  is  that  we  have  excluded  foreign 
current and deferred taxes and U.S.  deferred taxes from the numerator 
in the computation of the adjusted tax rate. The effect of this exclusion 
is most  significant for international corporations, particularly oil  com- 
panies such as Exxon. Because the oil royalties that Exxon pays to pro- 
ducing countries are treated as foreign taxes, it reports foreign taxes of 
$7.1 billion and a total tax bill of $7.7 billion, including its current U.S. 
taxes, which amount to only $623 million. The magnitude of these Exxon 
numbers can be appreciated by noting that excluding the company from 
the Dow list would lower the apparent total tax rate from 51 percent to 
40.8 percent. 
As with each individual adjustment, their sum has a very uneven impact 
among the Dow thirty companies. The two extremes are American Tele- 
phone and Telegraph and General Motors. The  1974 profits of the first 
would have been vastly increased  under purchasing-power-accrual  account- 
ing primarily due to its large deferral of taxes, the decrease in the value 
of its debt, and its enormous $27 billion net-debtor position. While the 
adjusted  profits of the Dow thirty in total exceeded reported profits by 46.2 
percent, this figure would  be  substantially reduced-to  18.7 percent- 
simply by excluding American Telephone and Telegraph. Unrealized ex- 
traordinary gains account for most  of the additional profit attributed to 
this company. Their regulated-profit  constraints prevent AT&T and other 
public utilities from realizing these gains at once. They can, however, carry 
them forward to be realized in a year when their profit constraint would 
permit. For a company, such as AT&T, that seldom if ever earns apprecia- 
bly less than permitted by its regulators, the value of additional accrued 
gains is reduced. On the other hand, many regulated firms and industries- 
for example, airlines and railroads-rarely  find their profit constraints 
binding. 
In contrast with American Telephone and Telegraph, the 1974 earnings 
of General Motors would have been reduced by 43 percent if the accrual- 
accounting conventions were adopted. This reduction comes principally 
course, pay notoriously  low U.S. tax rates,  while American  Telephone  and Telegraph's 
deferred  taxes and its large profit  on its debt combine  to give it an adjusted  tax rate of 
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from  the  increased  depreciation  the company  would  report  using  a general- 
value  policy  and  the large  correction  necessary  to express  its inventories  in 
constant  dollars. In total, eight companies  would have reported  lower 
earnings  after  our corrections.  For seven,  the reduction  can be attributed 
to adoption  of a constant-dollar  FIFO  policy.  The accounts  of the remain- 
ing firm,  Anaconda,  were severely  affected  by the foreign  expropriation 
of a portion  of its assets. 
Classifying  the various adjustments  into extraordinary  and ordinary 
categories  is necessarily  arbitrary.  Nonetheless,  with the exception  of the 
change in the market  value of  outstanding  debt (table 6, column 7), 
one would  expect  each  of our  adjustments  to recur  annually  in an environ- 
ment of steady  inflation.  The exceptional  entry  reflects  changes  in interest 
rates (loosely linked to changes  in inflation  rates) and not the absolute 
level of these  figures.  In fact, should  interest  rates  stabilize  at their  present 
levels, bond values would climb slowly for the next several  years as the 
individual  long-term  issues approach  maturity  (and par). Thus, future 
entries  in column  7 could turn negative  even with a steady  but high rate 
of inflation.  Given the maturity  structure  and average  selling  price  of the 
debt  of the Dow companies  at the beginning  of 1974,  the expected  increase 
in the present  or market  value of such liabilities  in that year was about 
$200 million (assuming  constant  long-term  interest  rates). This increase 
was, of course, swamped  by the decrease  of approximately  $3.5 billion 
in the value of these obligations  brought  about by the sharp  rise in the 
interest-rate  structure. 
Although  table 6 lists separately  each of the adjustments  necessary  to 
move to a purchasing-power-accrual  definition  of income, we cannot, 
unfortunately,  use these components  to calculate  the impact  of adopting 
the capital-maintenance  concept. We have data for two  differences: 
(1) the decrease  in bond values (column  7) would not be included  as an 
income  adjustment;  and (2) the gain on net financial  liabilities  (column  8) 
would  be determined  using  book-value  rather  than  market-value  statistics 
(columns  4 and 8, respectively,  of table 4). The difference  that cannot  be 
estimated  with publicly  available  information  is that which arises from 
requiring  all of the Dow firms  to use LIFO  inventory  accounting.  We can 
get some  idea of the relative  impact  of the two real-income  concepts  with 
the macro  data, because  the impact of a universal  adoption  of LIFO is 
approximated  by the inventory  valuation  adjustment  (IVA). John B. Shoven and Jeremy I. Bulow  39 
ADJUSTMENTS  TO THE MACRO  DATA FOR PUCHASING-POWER  ACCRUAL 
Table 7 contains a summary of the macro estimates of the impact on 
the earnings of nonfinancial corporations for the period  1946-74 of the 
accounting proposals consistent with the purchasing-power-accrual  con- 
cept. The total adjustments (column  10) were negative for most  of  the 
first  fifteen years. Use of general-value  straight-line  depreciation (column 4) 
and constant-doliar  FIFO (column 5) would have resulted in reductions in 
nonfinancial corporate earnings outweighing the  small profits resulting 
from the net-debtor position (column 8) and the profits and losses in the 
bond and mortgage markets (columns 6 and 7). The only exceptional years 
were 1956 and 1959, when large declines in the value of outstanding debt 
gave nonfinancial corporations significant unreported profits. 
The sign of  the total  adjustments became predominantly positive  in 
the  1960s due to  the  1962 shortening of  service lives  for  depreciation 
purposes and to the steady fall in the value of outstanding bonds from 1965 
to  1969. From 1961 to  1969, nonfinancial corporations also experienced 
continuously increasing unreported gains from their net-debtor status. 
These factors combined more than offset the negative impact of a switch 
to constant-dollar FIFO. From 1970 to 1972 the bond market rebounded 
and tax depreciation began once again to fall below straight-line replace- 
ment cost. The increase in income from including the net-debtor gains of 
nonfinancial corporations was just about canceled by the negative impact 
of  constant-dollar FIFO.  The total  adjustments were thus negative for 
these three years, with the difference between those in 1969 and those in 
1971 being  $48.3 billion.  This tremendously  large  turnabout  occurred 
because,  while the  bonds  and  mortgages  of  nonfinancial corporations 
declined in value by $25.2 billion in the earlier year, they appreciated by 
$19.3 billion in the later one. 
Since 1971 there has  been  another reversal in  the  total  adjustments 
necessary to  approximate  the  purchasing-power-accrual definition  of 
profits. Again, the net effect could be largely credited to  the bond and 
mortgage markets, but, as we have repeatedly stressed, the rising rate of 
inflation has lent increasing importance to  the other adjustments. Even 
the dividend adjustment to year-end dollars (column 9) amounted to $1.8 
billion in 1974. The largest correction with a negative impact on earnings 
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Table 7.  Total Accounting  Adjustments  Necessary to Implement  Real Haig- 
Billions  of dollars,  except  as noted 
Profit  Current 
(national  income  U.S.  federal 
account  basis)  and state  Depre-  Effect of  Decrease 
income  ciation  constanit-  in 
After  Before  tax  adjust-  dollar  bonid 
tax  tax  liabilities  mentt  FIFO  values 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1946  13.4  22.0  8.6  -2.2  -1.6  1.5 
1947  18.2  29.1  10.8  -2.6  -3.7  1.6 
1948  19.9  31.8  11.9  -3.2  -1.2  -0.7 
1949  15.4  24.9  9.5  -3.3  -0.1  -1.1 
1950  21.7  38.5  16.7  -3.8  -2.2  -0.8 
1951  18.1  39.1  21.0  -4.3  -1.9  2.5 
1952  16.0  33.8  17.8  -4.2  -1.6  -1.0 
1953  16.4  34.9  18.5  -3.5  -0.5  0.6 
1954  16.3  32.1  15.7  -2.4  -0.9  -2.0 
1955  22.2  42.0  19.8  -1.3  -1.3  0.9 
1956  22.1  41.8  19.8  -2.1  -2.6  6.0 
1957  20.9  39.8  18.9  -2.4  -3.1  0.3 
1958  17.5  33.7  16.3  -2.6  -1.8  0.0 
1959  22.5  43.2  20.8  -2.3  -1.1  4.2 
1960  20.6  40.1  19.5  -2.0  -1.4  -1.5 
1961  20.5  40.3  19.8  -1.8  -0.9  -0.7 
1962  23.9  44.7  20.9  0.7  -1.0  -1.2 
1963  26.2  49.1  22.9  1.0  -0.8  0.2 
1964  31.4  55.8  24.3  1.0  -1.6  -1.4 
1965  38.2  65.8  27.6  1.5  -1.1  1.4 
1966  41.2  71.2  30.1  1.3  -3.2  8.3 
1967  37.8  66.2  28.4  0.7  -4.5  5.2 
1968  38.3  72.4  34.0  0.0  -5.2  2.1 
1969  34.3  68.0  33.7  -0.5  -6.7  17.1 
1970  28.2  55.7  27.6  -2.5  -8.0  -9.0 
1971  33.4  63.2  29.8  -4.1  -5.7  -13.4 
1972  43.0  76.3  33.4  -3.8  -4.5  -1.9 
1973  55.0  95.8  40.7  -5.5  -5.2  12.7 
1974  64.5  110.1  45.6  -10.3  -16.2  24.1 
Sources: Columns 1, 2, 3, 1946-63, U.S.  Deparrment of Commerce, The National Income and Product 
Accounts of the United States, 1929-1965: Statistical Tables (1966), tables 6.15, 6.13, 6.14, respectively; 
for later years, Survey of Current  Business various July issues; column 4 is the dlfference  between columns 
1 and 5, table 2, In Shoven and Bulow, "Inflation Accountlng: Physical Assets"; column 5 is from ibid., 
table 5, column 7; column 6 is from table 2 above, column 5; column 7 is from table 3 above, column 4; John B. Shoven and Jeremy L. Bulow  41 
Simons  Accrual  Income  for All U.S.  Nonfinancial  Corporations,  1946-74 
Adjustment  Adjusted 
profit  U.S. tax rate 
Gain  on  as a  (percent) 
Decrease  net  Dividend  Total  Adjusted  percentage 
in mortgage  financial  adjust-  adjust-  after-tax  of NIA  NIA 
values  liabilities  ment  ments  profit  profit  average Effective 
(7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
0.6  0.3  0.3  -1.1  12.3  91.8  39.1  42.5 
0.7  1.1  0.3  -2.6  15.6  85.7  37.1  42.0 
-0.3  0.5  0.1  -4.8  15.1  75.9  37.4  44.5 
-0.5  -0.3  0.0  -5.3  10.1  65.6  38.2  48.3 
-0.3  1.0  0.3  -5.8  15.9  73.3  43.4  52.1 
0.9  0.8  0.1  -1.9  16.2  89.5  53.7  56.9 
-0.4  0.4  0.1  -6.7  9.3  58.1  52.7  65.9 
0.2  0.2  0.0  -3.0  13.4  81.7  53.0  58.1 
-0.7  0.4  0.1  -5.5  10.8  66.3  48.9  59.4 
0.4  0.6  0.1  -0.6  21.6  97.3  47.1  48.1 
2.3  1.2  0.2  5.0  27.1  122.6  47.4  42.7 
0.1  0.9  0.2  -4.0  16.9  80.9  47.5  53.2 
0.0  0.7  0.1  -3.6  13.9  79.4  48.4  54.2 
1.9  0.6  0.1  3.4  25.9  115.1  48.1  44.7 
-0.5  0.5  0.1  -4.8  15.8  76.7  48.6  55.5 
-0.0  0.3  0.1  -3.0  17.5  85.4  49.1  53.2 
-0.3  0.5  0.1  -1.2  22.7  95.0  46.8  48.1 
0.3  0.8  0.1  1.6  27.8  106.1  46.6  45.4 
-0.5  0.9  0.1  -1.5  29.9  95.2  43.5  45.0 
0.8  1.2  0.2  4.0  42.2  110.5  41.9  39.8 
4.3  2.5  0.3  13.5  54.7  132.8  42.3  35.9 
2.1  3.0  0.4  6.9  44.7  118.3  42.9  39.3 
0.9  3.7  0.5  2.0  40.3  105.2  47.0  46.3 
8.1  6.1  0.6  24.7  59.0  172.0  49.6  37.0 
-5.2  5.5  0.5  -18.7  9.5  33.7  49.6  74.9 
-5.9  5.2  0.3  -23.6  9.8  29.3  47.2  75.6 
-0.1  6.9  0.3  -3.1  39.9  92.8  43.8  46.6 
8.4  17.1  0.9  28.4  83.4  151.6  42.5  33.7 
13.8  26.2  1.8  39.4  103.9  161.1  41.4  31.7 
column 8 is from table 5 above, column 8; column 9 is from National Inicome  and Product Accounts, 1929- 
1965, table 6.16, and Survey of Current  Buisiniess,  various July issues, dividends paid throughout the year 
adjusted by the authors to year-end dollars; column 10 is the sum of columns 4 through 9; column 11 is 
the sum of columns 10 and 1; column 12 is column 11 divided by column 1, expressed  as a percent; column 
13 is column 3 divided by column 2, expressed as a percent; column 14 is column 3 in year-end dollars 
divided by the sum of column 3 in year-end dollars and column 11, expressed  as a percent. 42  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1976 
The  table  indicates  that a constant-dollar  FIFO  policy  would  have  resulted 
in lowering  reported  earnings  by $16.2 billion. The other change that 
would have reduced  profits is general-value  depreciation.  Depreciation 
allowances  in 1974  were substantially  more inadequate  than ever before, 
with tax depreciation  falling  some $10.3 billion short of straight-line  re- 
placement  cost  (using  0.85  of Bulletin  F service  lives).  These  two  large  nega- 
tive factors  were  more  than offset  by the decline  in market  value  of bonds 
and mortgages  ($37.9 billion)  and the net-debtor  profit  ($26.2 billion). 
The micro and macro tables are not strictly comparable.  A  major 
difference  is that the macro table records  profits and tax liabilities  on 
the national  income  accounts  basis (column 1, table 7) rather  than book 
profits;  hence,  no correction  for deferred  taxes  is needed.  In addition,  the 
NIA average  and the effective  tax rates of table 7 are both U.S. rates 
because the macro data exclude foreign taxes, in contrast with those 
reported  in table  6 for the Dow Jones  companies. 
Speculating  about  what  the macro  adjustments  of table  7 will look like 
over  the next  few  years,  we believe  that  profits  from  net financial  liabilities 
will likely  continue  to be large,  while  the negative  effect  of moving  to con- 
stant-dollar  FIFO may be reduced  as more firms  adopt LIFO. The two 
effects could approximately  cancel one another.  There is no reason to 
expect  tax depreciation  to be as large  as it would  be under  a straight-line 
replacement-cost  or general-value  system,  so that the adoption  of such a 
method would imply a continued  subtraction  from reported  earnings. 
These  three  effects  should  result  in a moderate  net negative  correction  on 
earnings.  The implication  is that the sign on the total of our adjustments 
may  well hinge  on the one extraordinary  item, the gain  or loss in the value 
of long-term  liabilities.  Predicting  future  movements  in interest  rates  is a 
risky  business,  so we will  merely  point out that  under  the naive  assumption 
that interest rates remain unchanged,  nonfinancial  corporations  would 
experience  an unreported  loss of $3 billion  to $4 billion  as their debt ap- 
preciates  toward  par. While the overall  conclusion  of such difficult  pre- 
dictions  cannot  be precise,  we simply  emphasize  that  the $39.4  billion  total 
positive  adjustment  to 1974  earnings  could easily reverse  sign in the im- 
mediate  future.  In fact,  table  7 reveals  that  purchasing-power-accrual,  after- 
tax profits  have fluctuated  much more than have NIA after-tax  profits, 
particularly  in the past ten years.  This variation  is not surprising,  con- 
sidering  that  profits  are  determined  as residuals  and  that  interest  rates  have 
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ADJUSTMENT TO MACRO DATA  FOR CAPITAL MAINTENANCE 
We have compiled  sufficient  data to compute  the macro  time series  of 
capital-maintenance  income  for nonfinancial  corporations,  as well as that 
for the accrual  of purchasing  power.  The results  are shown in column 6 
of table  8, where  columns  3 through  5 show  the magnitudes  of the different 
adjustments.  Capital-maintenance  income would not include  changes  in 
the value  of long-term  liabilities,  would  imply  LIFO  rather  than constant- 
dollar FIFO inventory  accounting,  and would determine  net financial 
liabilities  using  book rather  than  market  values.  The table shows  that the 
two real-income  concepts  can  lead  to very  different  measures,  and,  further, 
that the numerical  relationship  between  them is anything  but constant. 
The absolute  difference  was greater  in 1974 than in any other postwar 
year: the capital-maintenance  figure,  at $52.8 billion, was just half the 
Haig-Simons  profits  of $103.9  billion.  At the same  time, NIA profits  were 
running  at the rate of $64.5  billion.'0 
Most of the difference  between  purchasing-power-accrual  income and 
capital-maintenance  income depends  on two adjustments  (the change  in 
the value of long-term  liabilities  and the real appreciation  of inventories) 
that do not represent  sustainable  sources of income. These corrections 
would  not be expected  to continue  at the sizable  magnitudes  of 1973  and 
1974  even if inflation  should  persist.  Again,  the fundamental  issue is how 
these  extraordinary  gains  should  be treated.  It is the  timing  of the  recording 
of the changes  in these values that differentiates  the various  real-income 
measures.  The  Haig-Simons  approach,  the one we favor,  calls  for  recording 
them as soon as they occur,  although  they could and should be labeled 
as extraordinary.  The capital-maintenance  approach  distributes  gains or 
losses on the value of liabilities  over their life, and allows an indefinite 
postponement  of inventory  appreciation.  A third  possibility,  suggested  by 
James  Tobin,  is, in a sense,  the extreme  opposite  to the accrual  approach. 
It involves converting  extraordinary  gains such as those on bonds or 
inventories  to "sustainable"  flows by treating  them as if they had been 
used  to purchase  consols.  Rather  than bringing  all gains  up to the present 
as much as possible, this income measure  would record the flow that 
10. The market  value of the common-stock  holdings of private  noninsured  pension 
funds  fell by approximately  $26 billion in 1974.  These assets  would be carried  at market 
under  purchasing-power  accrual.  A substantial,  but unknown,  fraction  of this extraor- 
dinary  loss was borne by nonfinancial  corporations. 44  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1976 
Table 8.  Comparison  of Income, Using Concepts  Based on National 
Income Accounts,  Haig-Simons Accrual, and Capital Maintenance, 
Nonfinancial  Corporations,  1946-74 
BiHions  of dollars 
Difference 
Increase  in  LIFO  between  net- 
value  of  less  liability  Capital- 
After-tax  profit  outstanding  constanit-  profit using  main- 
long-term  dollar  book and  tenance- 
NIA  Accrued  liabilities  FIFO  market  values  income 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1946  13.4  12.3  -2.1  -3.7  0.0  6.5 
1947  18.2  15.6  -2.3  -2.2  0.1  11.2 
1948  19.9  15.1  1.0  -1.0  0.2  15.3 
1949  15.4  10.1  1.6  2.0  0.0  13.7 
1950  21.7  15.9  1.1  -2.8  0.1  14.3 
1951  18.1  16.2  -3.4  0.7  0.0  13.5 
1952  16.0  9.3  1.4  2.6  0.1  13.4 
1953  16.4  13.4  -0.8  -0.5  0.0  12.1 
1954  16.3  10.8  2.7  0.6  0.0  14.1 
1955  22.2  21.6  -1.3  -0.4  0.0  19.9 
1956  22.1  27.1  -8.3  -0.1  0.1  18.8 
1957  20.9  16.9  -0.4  1.6  0.3  18.4 
1958  17.5  13.9  0.0  1.5  0.2  15.6 
1959  22.5  25.9  -6.1  0.6  0.1  20.5 
1960  20.6  15.8  2.0  1.6  0.3  19.7 
1961  20.5  17.5  0.7  0.8  0.2  19.2 
1962  23.9  22.7  1.5  1.3  0.2  25.7 
1963  26.2  27.8  -0.5  0.3  0.2  27.8 
1964  31.4  29.9  1.9  1.1  0.3  33.2 
1965  38.2  42.2  -2.2  -0.6  0.3  39.7 
1966  41.2  54.7  -12.6  1.4  0.4  43.9 
1967  37.8  44.7  -7.3  3.4  0.9  41.7 
1968  38.3  40.3  -3.0  1.9  1.4  40.6 
1969  34.3  59.0  -25.2  1.6  2.0  37.4 
1970  28.2  9.5  14.2  3.2  3.3  30.2 
1971  33.4  9.8  19.3  0.8  1.7  31.6 
1972  43.0  39.9  2.0  -2.5  1.1  40.5 
1973  55.0  83.4  -21.1  -12.4  2.1  52.0 
1974  64.5  103.9  -37.9  -18.9  5.7  52.8 
Sources: Columns 1 and 2 are from table 7, columns 1 and 11, respectively; column 3 is the negative of 
the sum of columns 6 and 7 of table 7; column 4 is the difference between columns 8 and 7 of table 5 in 
Shoven and Bulow, "Inflation Accounting: Physical Assets"; column 5 is the difference between columns 
4 and 8 in table 5 above; column 6 is the sum of columns 2 through 5. John B. Shoven and Jeremy L Bulow  45 
would be available  to the firm  if its total net worth  were invested  in an 
infinite annuity. 
All three of these real-income  measures  would.have  the same present 
discounted  value  of expected  future  income  streams.  The choice concerns 
timing  only, and firms  could be asked to report  more than one of these 
measures.  Each  gives  a far  more  accurate  picture  of the financial  condition 
of the enterprise  than do present practices  of accelerated  original-cost 
depreciation,  the choice of LIFO or nominal  FIFO, and neglect of the 
net-debtor  profit. If more than one measure  were expected,  simplifying 
assumptions  might  be considered  so that vast accounting  resources  and 
paper  work  were  not required  to report  supplementary  income  figures. 
As our earlier  paper noted, none of the current  U.S. proposals for 
inflation  accounting  is sufficiently  far-reaching  to assure  consistency  with 
economic  definitions  of real  income."  Although  the  FASB  proposal  loosely 
embodies  a capital-maintenance  philosophy,  it is only a suggestion  for 
supplemental  reporting,  allows  a choice  of inventory-accounting  methods, 
and permits  accelerated  general-value  depreciation  (a policy that in our 
opinion  understates  profits).  The proposal  does call for including  the real 
gain  due  to the net-debtor  status  of most  nonfinancial  corporations,  which 
is called  for under  any  real-income  measure.  The total  impact  of the FASB 
proposals  on the 1973 and 1974 earnings  of the thirty  Dow industrials 
has been  computed  by Davidson  and Weil.'2  A comparison  with our data 
is blurred  because  these authors  do not break  the adjustment  down into 
components  for each company;  but their conclusion  that the median  re- 
duction  in reported  net earnings  of the Dow companies  was 8 percent  in 
1973  and 12  percent  in 1974  is broadly  consistent  with  our  macro  estimates 
of the effect  of implementing  accounting  principles  based  on capital-main- 
tenance  income.  Among the Dow thirty,  they too found that American 
11. Cost Accounting Standards  Board, "Proposed Rules: Historical Depreciation 
Costs-Adjustment for Inflation,"  Federal  Register,  vol. 40, no. 197 (October  9, 1975), 
pp. 47517-19; 4 CFR, pt. 413; FASB, "Financial  Reporting  in Units of General  Pur- 
chasing Power"; Securities  and Exchange Commission,  Notice of Proposed Amend- 
ments to Regulation  S-X to Require Disclosure  of Certain  Replacement  Cost Data in 
Notes to Financial  Statements  (S7-579). 
12. The 1973 estimates are in Sidney Davidson and Roman L. Weil, "Inflation 
Accounting: What Will General Price Level Adjusted Income Statements Show?" 
Financial  Analysts  Journal,  vol. 31 (January/February  1975), pp. 27-31, 70-84. The 
1974  estimates  are in their  article,  "Impact  of Inflation  Accounting  on 1974 Earnings," 
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Telephone  and  Telegraph's  earnings  are currently  the most grossly  under- 
stated,  primarily  because  of its huge  net-debtor  status. 
The  SEC  and  CASB  proposals  omit  some  of the  major  corrections  neces- 
sary  to measure  real  income  and thus, we believe,  likely  would aggravate 
rather  than alleviate  the distortions  caused  by inflation.  The CASB  pro- 
posal  addresses  itself  simply  to the inadequacy  of original-cost  depreciation 
and suggests  a general-value  basis similar  to ours; however,  it permits 
the use of accelerated  techniques.  We see no economic  justification  for 
focusing  on the impact  of inflation  on one component  of the determination 
of income,  with  the  possible  exception  that  U.S. treatment  of profits  should 
be similar  to that of other  countries."3  For instance,  why is underdeprecia- 
tion because  of low original-cost  bases more fundamental  or important 
than the exaggeration  of interest  costs through  deducting  nominal  rather 
than real debt expenses?  The SEC proposal, which has recently  been 
adopted,  is slightly  more general  in asking for supplementary  reporting 
of profits calculated  with replacement-cost  depreciation  and inventory 
policies  (LIFO),  but, in a sense,  is even more  one-sided.  All of the correc- 
tions that decrease  reported  income  (and taxes if this policy were  eventu- 
ally adopted  for that use) are included,  while  none of those that increase 
profits are considered.  Economists  should at least point out that these 
accounting  "reforms"  taken  individually  are not consistent  with concepts 
of real income, and may be at best an indirect,  uneven, and inefficient 
method  of lowering  corporate  taxes. Even this last consideration  is aca- 
demic,  at least now, since neither  the Congress  nor the Internal  Revenue 
Service  has endorsed  any of these proposals.  Further,  the complicated 
mechanics  of replacement-cost  (rather  than the simplifed general-value) 
depreciation  should  be weighed  against  the value  of the  footnote  disclosure 
requirement  of the SEC. 
In their recent  examination  of taxes and inflation,  Fellner,  Clarkson, 
and Moore suggest  business-accounting  reforms  similar  to ours (general- 
value  depreciation,  constant-dollar  FIFO, and accounting  for the gain on 
net liabilities).'4  However,  because  they  focused  on the impact  on aggregate 
13. A survey  of foreign experience  with inflation  accounting  since 1945 is presented 
in George  E. Lent, "Adjusting  Taxable  Profits  for Inflation:  The Foreign  Experience" 
(paper  presented  at the Brookings  Conference  on Inflation  and the Income  Tax System, 
Washington,  D.C.,  October 30-31,  1975, scheduled for appearance  in a  Brookings 
conference  volume). 
14. William  Fellner, Kenneth W. Clarkson,  and John H. Moore, Correcting  Taxes 
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nonfinancial  corporate  profits  (and did not consider  individual  balance 
sheets),  they were  able  to use a simpler  estimating  procedure.  Their  tech- 
nique involved general-value  depreciation  only on the portion of the 
capital stock financed  by equities.  The remainder  of the capital stock 
would  be carried  on an original-cost  basis and the liabilities  that financed 
it would  be listed at book value. The errors  in carrying  these assets and 
liabilities  on an original-cost  basis  cancel,  and the net effect  (with  general- 
value accounting)  is the same as if both were adjusted  for inflation.  The 
market-value  correction  for bonds, called for by a purchasing-power- 
accrual,  but not a capital-maintenance,  definition  of income, was not 
included  in the study  by Fellner  and his associates. 
INTERPRETING  THE  1974  RESULTS 
Our preference  for the Haig-Simons  accrual  concept of income will 
hardly  come as a surprise  to anyone  who has read this far. Income,  we 
argue,  should measure  the capacity  to consume  and not depend on the 
choices about realization  and actual consumption.  We recognize the 
problems  of defining  the set of goods in the purchasing  opportunity  set 
and of determining  the interval  over which the capacity  to consume  is 
to be measured.  In fact, these considerations  determine  whether  pur- 
chasing-power-accrual,  capital-maintenance,  or  sustainable income is 
most appropriate.  Having stated our preference,  we must explain why 
nonfinancial  corporate  income  on that basis  rose in 1974  to $103.9  billion 
at the same time that the stock market  (and other indicators)  suggested 
that business  had worsened.  Of course,  this same paradox  is relevant  to 
NIA profits,  which  rose 17 percent  to an historic  high in 1974. 
Part of the reconciliation  may lie in the fact that the economy  did not 
begin  to worsen  rapidly  until the third  quarter  of 1974.  Thus,  taken as a 
whole,  the year was significantly  better  than the year-end  position of the 
economy  indicated.  But more fundamentally,  three reasons resolve the 
apparent  contradiction.  First, much of accrued  income in 1974 was ex- 
traordinary  and  could  not be expected  to recur.  While  these  gains  are  legiti- 
mate  profits  in our view, they are not so valuable  as an equal  increase  in 
sustainable  income. Second, internal  cash flow was very tight; whether 
or not firms  could  have  chosen  otherwise,  a very  high  percentage  of Haig- 
Simons  income  was accrued  and not realized  in 1974.  Investors  and firms 
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financing.  Finally, and perhaps  most important,  the large relative  price 
changes  of 1973-74  may have led to significant  decreases  in the value of 
the existing  capital  stock that we have been unable  to capture.  Examples 
are easy to come by, but estimating  the total impact  may be impossible. 
Take a firm  that owned  a large  glass office  building  and an inventory  of 
oil to heat  it. With  a relative  rise  in the price  of oil, the firm  experiences  a 
real capital  gain on its oil inventory  (which  is recorded  with a constant- 
dollar  FIFO  policy),  but a far larger  loss in the value  of the building.  Con- 
ceptually,  we would  include  both changes  in value  in the computation  of 
profits,  but  the  estimates  of this  paper  include  only  the  former  (and  smalier) 
adjustment.  In practice,  such capital  losses would  be difficult  to estimate. 
In this  particular  case,  the loss was due to an increase  in the present  value 
of uncontracted  future  liabilities  associated  with  the asset  (office  building). 
A final factor in reconciling  the record 1974 profits of nonfinancial 
corporations  with the general  adverse  impression  of business  conditions 
is that the real income  of other sectors  was not as high as reported.  The 
equity  holders'  gain  on the financial  liabilities  of nonfinancial  corporations 
was matched  by the losses of those who held those obligations  as assets. 
This implies  that the household  sector and, probably  to a lesser extent, 
financial  intermediaries  had substantial  real losses in 1974  from their  net 
holdings  of long-term  nominally  denominated  assets. As a result of the 
rapid inflation,  there was a large overstatement  of the incomes of net 
creditors  in 1974,  and a corresponding  understatement  of the experience 
of net debtors. 
Conclusions 
Our  two papers  establish  the importance  of the choice  of the real-income 
measure  and of correcting  both sides of balance  sheets  for inflation.  The 
procedures  to adjust for inflation  associated  with the two real-income 
measures  we have presented  differ greatly. However, any measure of 
profits  corrected  for inflation  must cover financial  liabilities,  a step not 
taken  in most of the proposals  for reform  made  in this country. 
Attention  in the past few  years  has  been  directed  largely  to "exaggerated 
profits" arising from nominal inventory appreciation  and inadequate 
depreciation.  Our  macro  results  confirm  that  these  two factors  have  tended 
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profits  of nonfinancial  corporations  were  increased  $10.3 billion through 
the use of accelerated  original-cost  rather  than straight-line  replacement- 
cost depreciation,  and  were  exaggerated  another  $16 billion  or $35 billion 
(depending  on the real-income  measure)  because of the recording  of 
nominal  inventory  profits.  However,  accelerated  original-cost  tax deprecia- 
tion has  been  more  than  adequate  for some  firms,  particularly  those  whose 
capital  investments  have been growing  rapidly.  Because  of the influence 
of this growth  rate  and  because  the adequacy  of original-cost  depreciation 
also depends  on the durability  of a firm's capital and the accounting 
technique  chosen,  the impact  of the adoption  of a uniform  procedure  for 
inflation  adjustment  would be very uneven. Likewise,  firms that use a 
LIFO inventory  policy do not report nominal inventory appreciation 
(without  liquidation)  and, relative  to purchasing-power-accrual  income, 
understated  rather  than overstated  this income  in 1974.  Again,  the impact 
of an inventory-accounting  policy consistent  with an economic  definition 
of real  income  would  be very  uneven  across  firms. 
It is our  position  (consistent  with  Haig-Simons  accrual)  that accounting 
for the depreciation  of financial  liabilities  is as important  as reporting  the 
depreciation  of physical assets. By December 31, 1974, the long-term 
liabilities  of nonfinancial  corporations  were valued at some $85 billion 
less than their book or issue value. Under an accrual  system of income 
determination,  this difference  should be reflected  on balance  sheets and 
the $37.9  billion  decrease  in the value of these  liabilities  in 1974  should  be 
reported  as income to the equity holders.  Given that these issues were 
substantially  below par at the beginning  of the year, they would have 
appreciated  approximately  $4 billion  in an environment  of stable  interest 
rates.  This  implies  that the $38 billion  gain could be classified  as an ordi- 
nary (or expected)  loss of $4 billion and an extraordinary  gain of $42 
billion. 
Under the capital-maintenance  approach,  the way to treat long-term 
liabilities  is to disregard  changes  in their value because  they can be ex- 
pected  to return  to par at maturity.  The argument  is that if such an asset 
or liability  is going to be held until maturity,  the welfare  of the equity 
holders  is independent  of values before  repurchase.  We argue,  however, 
that  it is the opportunity  to repurchase  debt  at discount  that  affects  welfare 
and that such opportunities  should  be reckoned  in income. 
The second  correction  with respect  to financial  liabilities  compensates 
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This correction  was $26 billion or $32 billion in 1974 for nonfinancial 
corporations  in the aggregate  (depending  on how liabilities  are valued), 
but again  the impact  was  uneven  among  firms  due  to the variation  in their 
financial  structure.  Unlike  the correction  to market  value,  this net-liability 
adjustment  is appropriate  under  all real-income  measures. 
When all of the adjustments  necessary  to implement  a real-income 
measure  are totaled, the impact on reported  profits  is not so one-sided 
as is commonly  believed.  In fact, our estimates  of accrued  profits  for 1973 
and 1974 substantially  exceed NIA nonfinancial  corporate  profits. Not 
all of the corrections  reflect  inflation;  in fact, two of the largest  concern 
extraordinary  items  not necessarily  associated  with a steady  deterioration 
in the  purchasing  power  of the dollar.  These  factors  can  cut in the opposite 
direction,  as they  did in 1970  when,  according  to our  calculations,  accrued 
profits  were substantially  below those recorded  in the national  income 
accounts. 
The purpose  of these two papers  has been to present  and estimate  the 
accounting changes necessary to implement measures of the real income 
of  nonfinancial  corporations.  Inflation  accounting  is  receiving  much 
attention  in both the United States  and Europe  by accountants,  and war- 
rants  examination  from the perspective  of economics.  The data we have 
assembled  indicate  that the magnitudes  involved  are extremely  large  both 
absolutely  and relatively,  and that net income as currently  determined 
can be quite misleading.  We hope that this work will stimulate  further 
discussions  of measures  of real corporate  income and lead to other in- 
vestigations  into the broader topic of  inflation accounting.  Also, we 
believe that several  of our specific  proposals  warrant  examination  with 
a critical  eye by the economics  and accounting  professions,  with a view 
to their  possible  adoption. 
APPENDIX 
Other  Corrections  to Profits 
In this and our previous paper, we have examined the accounting treat- 
ment  of  each  major balance-sheet entry.  However,  several  additional 
corrections  would  be desirable  in order  to establish  complete  consistency 
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power  accrual  or income  above  what  is necessary  for capital  maintenance. 
The most important  of these "off  balance  sheet"  adjustments  involve  the 
assets and liabilities of noninsured  pension funds and practices  with 
respect  to accounting  leases.  In the absence  of adequate  information  on 
these  items,  we cannot  make  the sort  of estimates  of the impact  of changing 
accounting  practices  that we have with the other issues, but will simply 
discuss  our view of some of the appropriate  considerations  for them. 
Assets  aiid  Liabilities  of Pension  Funds 
Accounting  for the future pension obligations  amassed  by the firm 
is clearly  important  in determining  its financial  position  and net income. 
Currently,  the only impact pension funds have on reported  profits is 
through  the direct  contributions  of the firm. This process  is completely 
consistent  with the current  treatment  of bond liabilities,  which requires 
only actual  interest  payments  to enter the computation  of income.  While 
the situation  is somewhat  less clear  (partially  due to the rapidly  changing 
regulations  with respect  to pension funds and the lack of a market  for 
these obligations),  we argue that some adjustments  similar  to those we 
have suggested  for bonds may be appropriate  for pension funds-for 
supplementary  reporting  if not for the computation  of profits.  We also 
want to emphasize  the important  impact that inflation  and changes  in 
its rate  have on a firm's  pension-fund  obligations. 
Unfortunately,  we have been able to gather  only very  limited  aggregate 
data with regard  to pension  funds;  but they are sufficient  to confirm  the 
significance  of the funds  in determining  the net income of an enterprise. 
During 1974, employer  contributions  to private noninsured  funds rose 
18 percent  to $16.9 billion, while benefit  payouts  climbed 15 percent  to 
$10.7 billion. Despite the net inflow, the market  value of the assets of 
these pension funds declined $20.5 billion, nearly matching  the 1973 
decrease  of $22.1 billion. By the end of 1974,  the total market  value of 
the assets amounted  to $111.7  billion, or 72 percent  of their value two 
years  earlier.  The value of the common-stock  holdings  of private  pension 
funds fell by $50.8  billion over the two years,  despite  net new purchases 
of $4.7 billion.15  By December  31, 1974,  according  to a rough estimate, 
15. These  data  were  made  available  by the U.S. Securities  and Exchange  Commission. 
Most are reported  in Richard L. Gordon, "SEC Report Shows Bear Market Bite of 
$21 Billion  from Funds' Assets," Pensionis  & Investments, vol. 4 (January 5,  1976),  pp. 
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the aggregate  unfunded  liability  of private  noninsured  pension  funds  was 
$65 billion, up  $30 billion from December 31,  1973.16 It  is the proper 
accounting  for such  large  changes  in net unfunded  liabilities  that we wish 
to explore. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTUARIAL  ASSUMPTIONS  AND  INFLATION 
Most of the above data  refer  to the assets  of pension  funds  rather  than 
their liabilities-for good reason: an actuarially  sound measure  of the 
present  value of a pension  fund's  liabilities  is difficult  to compute.  Firms 
are given wide leeway  in making  assumptions  about such things as the 
rate of return  on assets  (that is, the discount  rate to apply to future  lia- 
bilities),  the rate of inflation,  and the average  turnover  of their labor 
force.  The IRS guidelines  simply  require  "reasonableness."  Without  thor- 
oughly investigating  this issue here, we simply note the sensitivity  of 
net liabilities  to these assumptions.  Varying  the assumed  rate of return 
(also used  as the discount  rate)  on a fund's  assets  by 0.25 percentage  point 
may  produce  a differential  of 6 to 7 percent  in the present  value of future 
liabilities  if the liabilities  are fixed in nominal  terms.'7  Further,  should 
every  pension  plan  raise  its rate-of-return  assumption  0.25  point,  aggregate 
unfunded  liabilities  would decline  by approximately  20 percent.  Current 
pension  costs, and hence reported  profits,  are also extremely  sensitive  to 
actuarial  assumptions  with the present  accounting  practices.  This sensi- 
tivity was demonstrated  in 1973 when du Pont raised its rate-of-return 
assumption  0.5 point and, in so doing, lowered its pension-fund  con- 
tributions  16 percent  from $121.1  million  to $101.3  million. 
The above examples of the sensitivity  of net liabilities  and current 
contributions  to the projected  rate of return on assets have assumed 
16. These rough estimates  are our own. We established  that the net liabilities  of the 
100 largest  private  noninsured  pension  funds amounted  to 32 percent  of the book value 
of their  assets  at the end of 1972  (from U.S. Department  of Labor,  Labor-Management 
Services  Administration,  "The 100 Largest  Retirement  Plans, 19601972," U.S.D.L., 
1974;  processed).  This figure  was assumed  to be constant  through  the end of 1974,  and 
to be relevant for all noninsured  funds. The estimate of $65 billion in net liabilities 
for 1974 is 32 percent of the $133.7 billion of assets in such pension funds (at book 
value) plus the $22 billion difference  between  book and market  value for these assets. 
The 1973  figure  of $35 billion was estimated  similarly. 
17. Ernest  L. Hicks, Accounting  for the Cost of Pension  Plans, Accounting  Research 
Study 8 (American  Institute  of Certified  Public Accountants,  1965),  p. 117. John B. Shoven and Jeremy L Bulow  53 
constant  nominal  obligations.  Many pension contracts  are of this form 
(providing,  say, $10 per month per year of service), while others are 
partially  or even fully adjusted  for inflation.'8  If the increase  in the rate 
of return  on assets reflects  simply an increase  in the expected  rate of 
inflation,  then the net-liability  position of the firm will change only to 
the extent  that benefits  are not indexed. 
The level and changes  in long-term  interest  rates (partially  reflecting 
market  expectations  of inflation)  are also significant  for determining  the 
overall  financial  condition of the pension fund. Because  the firm may 
hold long-term  nominal  assets such as bonds and mortgages  in its fund, 
the analysis  of the first section of the text applies,  but in reverse.  Now, 
in the recent  periods  of rising  interest  rates, firms  have suffered  accrued 
capital  losses on such assets  (as well as on their  common-stock  holdings). 
Net liabilities  created  by such "experience  losses"  must  now be calculated 
every  three  years  and amortized  over  fifteen  years  (twenty  years  for multi- 
employer  plans).  At the same  time, higher  interest  rates  lower  the present 
value of the firm's  liabilities,  since most plans are not fully indexed  for 
active  workers  and are completely  nonindexed  for those already  retired.'9 
On balance,  increases  in interest  rates are likely to improve  the overall 
financial  position of the pension  funds.  While these funds do have long- 
term  financial  assets,  the liabilities  of pensions  defined  in nominal  terms 
also should be rediscounted  at the higher rates. Probably,  the average 
duration  of the liabilities  in this case exceeds  that of the assets, making 
them more sensitive  to variations  in interest  rates. Inflation  is beneficial 
also because  many plans "tax" the employees'  social security  benefits 
dollar for dollar at retirement.  When workers  leave the company  long 
before  retirement  age, inflation  also favors  the firm. Even if benefits  are 
fully  vested,  their  value  is eroded  during  the interval  before  payout  begins, 
so the higher  the rate of inflation  the greater  the gain to the firm. 
The projected  rates of inflation  of return on assets are only two of 
several  important  actuarial  assumptions.  As with depreciation  and in- 
ventory accounting,  there are several methods of determining  pension 
liabilities.  The most common  are termed  the "entry  age normal"  method 
18. Few, if any, private pension plans are adjusted more than 100 percent for in- 
flation  as are military  retirement  plans and social security. 
19. Howard E. Winklevoss,  of the University of Pennsylvania,  has estimated  that 
an increase  of 5 percentage  points in the rate of inflation, interest rates, and rate of 
salary  increase  decreases  the benefit  liabilities  by 13 percent  for the average  plan with 
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and the "unit-credit"  method,20  but other techniques  are widely used. 
The divergence  in the contributions  required  under  the various  commonly 
used  systems  can be 30 percent  or more.2' 
THE EFFECTS  OF PENSION FUNDS ON NONFINANCIAL CORPORATE  INCOME 
The Employee Retirement  Income Security Act  of  1974 (ERISA) 
requires  each firm  to disclose  the market  value of its pension-fund  assets 
and the actuarial  assumptions  used in calculating  liabilities.  When  these 
data become  available,  it will be possible to evaluate  numerically  some 
of the effects  just described.  Lacking  this information,  we will discuss 
changes  in pension accounting  that would be consistent  with our two 
definitions  of nonfinancial  corporate  income. 
The first change would sharpen  the accounting  and actuarial  guide- 
lines to improve  comparability  across  firms.  Second, we favor replacing 
the fifteen-year  amortization  of gains and losses on assets by their im- 
mediate  reflection  as corporate  income or loss. Such a procedure  would 
be consistent  with an accrual  definition  of income. Symmetrically,  we 
would rediscount  future  liabilities  each year in order  to determine  their 
present  value.  The discount  rate  would  depend  in some deterministic  way 
on the firms'  long-term  borrowing  costs. The difficult  issue is the appro- 
priate accounting  treatment  of past-service  liabilities  created  by the in- 
auguration  or improvement  of a pension plan. Such liabilities  are not 
strictly  comparable  to those involved in other forms of debt, and the 
appropriate  accounting  treatment  is not obvious. The terms of this lia- 
bility  are  vastly  more  complicated,  and  the degree  of uncertainty  is signifi- 
cantly  higher,  than those associated  with, for instance,  bonds. Perhaps  as 
a result,  there  is no market  for these obligations.  The accounting  options 
are (1) to reflect  the increase  in net liability  immediately  as a decrease  in 
income;  (2) to amortize  the past-service  costs over  the life of the contract; 
and (3) to amortize  over a long period, the current  practice.  Spreading 
the costs over many years may be justified  if one views the new liability 
as a substitute  for higher wages or makes a going-concern  assumption 
20. Of 500 firms  surveyed  in 1969  by the Pension  Trust Division of the Chase Man- 
hattan  Bank,  222 used  the entry-age  normal  method,  117  adopted  the unit-credit  method, 
50 used  the so-called  aggregate  method,  and 111  chose various  other  accepted  techniques. 
21. See Hicks, Accountinig  for the Cost of Pension  Plans, pp. 124-25, and Charles  L. 
Trowbridge,  "Fundamentals  of Pension Funding,"  Transactions  (Society of Actuaries), 
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and argues that the liability will be incurred over a lengthy period. A 
possible further consideration is the amount of the liability vested with 
the employees. We do  not  have a  strong opinion  on  the amortization 
of the post-service net liability created in new labor agreements, but find 
the current  practice defensible given the complicated nature of the problem. 
These complications are avoided, however, in defined-contribution plans 
(as opposed to defined-benefit plans), such as the TIAA-CREF  pension 
system for college teachers. Under this operation each employee has an 
individual pension-fund account, and his benefit is directly related to the 
contributions made on his behalf.22 
Leases 
One other important issue is the proper accounting for leases. These 
are often long-term, nominal obligations, on which inflation and changes 
in its rate cause unreported corporate gains and losses just as they do with 
bonds and mortgages. Our focus here is on long-term noncancelable leases, 
to use the accounting profession's term. Such leases have "an initial or 
remaining term of more than one year" and are either noncancelable or 
cancelable only under a "remote contingency or upon the payment of a 
substantial penalty."23  A  significant number are "financing leases,"  in- 
volving a procedure similar to that of purchase by the lessor financed by 
a mortgage from the lessee.24  Other long-term noncancelable leases may 
include contracts written for less than 75 percent of the asset's economic 
life and long-term supply agreements such as those often entered into by 
electric utilities for the delivery of fuel.25 
22. While this type of plan eliminates  all of the difficult  accounting problems  for 
corporate  pension  plans, it raises  the issue of how to treat  the earnings  of these  funds  in 
the computation  of personal  income. But that is not the topic of this paper. 
23. Securities  and Exchange Commission,  Accounting Series, Release 147, Notice 
of Adoption of Amendments  to Regulation S-X Requiring Improved Disclosure of 
Leases (October  5, 1973),  p. 5. 
24. A lease may qualify as a financing  lease on either of two grounds: (1) that the 
original lease, plus any renewals in the initial contract that have a high probability 
of being  exercised,  covers  at least 75 percent  of the economic  life of the asset; or (2) that 
the lease is written  to guarantee  the lessor full recovery  of his investment  plus a "fair 
return"  subject only to limited risk in the realization  of any residual interest in the 
property  and normal  loan risk. 
25. For information  on the specific  accounting  rules, see SEC, Notice of Adoption 
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While many items are leased because the firm wishes to use them for 
only a short period of time, desires  flexibility in its capital, or wants to avoid 
certain risks or conserve on  financial assets, financing leases are often 
written for tax and accounting purposes. A lease enables a firm to "sell" 
or "lend" tax deductions and credits that it may otherwise be unable to 
use to full advantage. For example, leases generally, and financing leases 
in particular, are structured to increase the reported profits and taxes of 
the lessee in the early years of a lease and decrease them subsequently. 
Symmetrically,  lessors pay less taxes in the initial years. Companies with 
large losses, and thus large tax credits (airlines provide examples), can 
lend these tax credits to  lessors and receive interest, which they do not 
receive from the government. Furthermore, the investment tax credit may 
be used only to reduce corporate tax liability by one-half for tax liabilities 
above the first $25,000. Firms with large domestic investment in long-term 
capital goods and low profits can arrange to "sell" these credits to lessors. 
The manufacturer lessor receives an additional tax advantage in that the 
profit and taxes on the delivery of the product are paid out only over the 
length  of  the  lease.26 Finally,  the  "off balance sheet"  nature  of  lease 
financing may be an attraction itself. The indenture in a firm's bonds may 
constrain it from issuing greater amounts of long-term debt but permit 
it to  enter long-term noncancelable leases, which do not appear on the 
balance sheet. While long-term and financing leases are common in some 
industries, like airlines, they are intensively used by very few of the Dow 
industrials (Woolworth is the most notable exception). 
Current rules on lease disclosure require firms to provide data on the 
minimum annual rentals under long-term noncancelable leases  if  that 
leasing constitutes more than 5 percent of the firm's total capitalization. 
26. For example,  if IBM builds a computer  for $600,000  and writes  a financing  lease 
for $1,250,000,  it reports $650,000 in profits over the length of the lease. If, on the 
other  hand, the computer  is sold for $1 million to a leasing  company  that in turn nego- 
tiates the same contract, IBM immediately  reports a  $400,000 gain and the leasing 
company  reports $250,000 over the life of the asset; thus, leasing serves to postpone 
the $400,000  profit  made on the sale. This is why companies  like IBM often state that 
the rate of increase  in its installations  is more germane  to its long-run financial  per- 
formance  than is its short-term  profit  increase.  A high ratio of sales to rentals  produces 
greater  accounting  profits  without greater  economic profits.  For more specifics  regard- 
ing the accounting  treatment  of manufacturers  as lessors, see American Institute of 
Certified  Public Accountants, Accounting Principles Board, "Accounting for Lease 
Transactions  by Manufacturer  or Dealer  Lessors,"  Opinions  of the Accounting  Principles 
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The effect of leasing on corporate profits must be reported if it amounts 
to 3 percent or more of the average profits earned over the previous three 
years (excluding loss years). 
We  believe all long-term noncancelable leases  should  be  transferred 
from the footnotes to the balance sheet proper, and that the income state- 
ment should reflect their effect on profits. Ideally, both the asset and the 
liability involved should be  carried at  their market or present values. 
However, as  with  other depreciable assets,  this  procedure probably is 
not feasible on the asset side, and we would carry the asset on a general- 
value basis (original value restated for the change in the purchasing power 
of  the dollar). Initially the value  of  the  asset would  equal the present 
value of the future lease payments. The asset's value would be increased 
by the percentage change in the general price level and would be depreci- 
ated as if it were owned by the firm for the duration of the noncancelable 
lease. On the liability side, all nominally denominated long-term leases 
should be treated as mortgages and counted in determining the net finan- 
cial liability of  the firm (and its corresponding "debtor's profits" with 
inflation). With the Haig-Simons accrual definition of corporate income, 
the present value of the future lease payments would be recalculated at 
the end of each year using the firm's borrowing cost as the discount rate. 
As with other long-term financial obligations, changes in the value of the 
liability would enter the computation  of net income. Comments  and 
Discussion 
William  Fellner:  At the present  stage  of the debate  about  inflation  account- 
ing, competent  analytical  and empirical  contributionst  such as those&  of 
Shoven  and Bulow  are clearly  to be welcomed.  This point deserves  to be 
stressed  particularly  by those of us who remain  unconvinced  by their  spe- 
cific  views  on controversial  matters.  I have  remained  unconvinced  and be- 
cause  of time  limitations,  I must  regretfully  concentrate  on the points  with 
which  I disagree. 
The  main  conclusion  suggested  by the  paper  is that,  with  the adjustments 
advocated  in it, the after-tax  profits  of nonfinancial  corporations  in the ag- 
gregate  greatly  exceeded  their  reported  profits  during  the  worst  phase  of the 
recent  inflation  (in 1973  and 1974).  A nonnegligible  excess  of the authors' 
adjusted  profits  over  the  reported  ones  develops  also  for  the  period  1965-74 
as a whole,  even  if not for each  year.  In most years  of that decade  the non- 
financial  corporate  sector  was taxed at a lower  rate relative  to its "true" 
profits  in the Shoven-Bulow  sense  than relative  to reported  profits.  Prag- 
matically,  this  seems  to me  the  main  conclusion  of the Shoven-Bulow  analy- 
sis, which,  under  the heading  of inflation  accounting,  focuses  on business 
taxation. 
What  makes  me dissent  from  the authors  is that instead  of doing  their 
best to separate  the taxation  aspect of the inflation-accounting  problem 
from  other  controversial  problems  of tax policy,  they have  tried  to get the 
reader  to accept  their own list of far-reaching  tax-reform  measures  in a 
single  package  with corrections  of business  taxes for inflation. 
Even  if a researcher  makes  an effort  to separate  problems,  inevitably  he 
will  have  to include  in his analysis  more  than  the problem  of inflation  ad- 
justments  for FIFO inventory  valuation  and for historical-cost  deprecia- 
tion. However,  the main  reason  why other  problems  cannot  be ignored  is 
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that, as a result  of debt  financing,  much  of the nominal  revaluation  gains, 
reflecting  merely  the  inflation  rate,  are  at present  taxable  not to the  investors 
but  to direct  and  indirect  creditors-that is, often  to households  in the form 
of taxable  nominal  interest  earnings.  Moreover,  regardless  of whether  such 
taxable  gains  accrue  to it, the household  sector  suffers  nondeductible  real 
losses  on its liquid  assets  as a result  of inflation.  I doubt  whether  in practice 
any logically  neat solution  can be worked  out for this specific  distortion 
of the tax position  of households;  but the problem  is one of economic  and 
social significance  and it should be considered  jointly with such matters 
as inflation  correction  for FIFO inventories  and for depreciation.  Yet the 
authors  seem to take the position  that these merely  nominal  revaluation 
gains  in the taxable  interest  earnings  of households,  and  the nondeductible 
real  losses  on liquid  assets,  are  not relevant  to their  present  concerns,  pre- 
sumably  because  these  problems  do not refer  to business  taxation.  In this 
regard,  the authors  obey  the  precept  of separating  areas  of research,  though 
I consider  this  an artificial  separation  of two sides  of one  and  the same  coin. 
On the other  hand, Shoven  and Bulow  discuss  what  would  be involved 
in changing  over  to the taxation  of the unrealized  real  capital  gains  of busi- 
ness,  and also the assumed  consequences  of a change  in the congressional 
attitude  toward  accelerated  depreciation.  These  matters  are not inscribed 
on the other  side of the inflation-correction  coin. The authors  merge  them 
with inflation  accounting  because,  quite aside from their views on that 
issue,  they are opposed  to the exemption  of unrealized  gains  from  the tax 
base  and also to accelerated  depreciation.  Hence,  they adjust  profits  in all 
these  respects  jointly. 
In my comments  on the earlier  Shoven-Bulow  paper  I expressed  a nega- 
tive view on their principle  of taxing unrealized  accruals.  I return  to it 
briefly  because  the difficulties  I mentioned  then have in fact prevented  the 
authors  from applying  their favored principle  with anything  like con- 
sistency. 
Every  home-owning  household  is aware  that the current  valuation  of a 
physical  asset  is subject  to a considerable  margin  of error  and that all po- 
tential creditors  also regard  such valuations  as very risky. Because the prob- 
lem here  is unrealized  accruals,  presumably  the owner  of the physical  asset 
should  not be forced  to sell it, and it is hard  to justify  including  in the tax 
base an estimated  accrual  on an unsold  asset as if it were comparable  to 
the taxpayer's  current  income  as usually  interpreted.  Although  the authors 
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holds,  the same  considerations  apply  to the plant  and  equipment  and land 
owned  by business  (except  that it is open to interpretation  whether  cur- 
rently  using  up and  replacing  a small  portion  of plant  and  equipment  is as- 
sociated  with  realization,  and  hence  for this portion  the U.S. tax code  is in 
fact striving  for a compromise). 
Including  unrealized  value  increments  in the tax base  would  require  the 
taxpaper  to secure  for the fiscal  authority  a definite  realized  revenue  as a 
counterpart  of a vaguely  estimated  unrealized  accrual;  the question  then  is, 
what happens  next? There are two possible answers:  (1) the taxpayer 
must in fact realize  promptly,  or (2) we wish to raise  the tax on past or 
current  realized  intake  by imposing  a levy related  to unrealized  gains.  Un- 
less we are willing  to go along with one of these answers,  the distinction 
between  realized  and unrealized  gains should be allowed to stand. The 
qualifying  proposition  that additional  credit  may be available  on the basis 
of revised  valuations  is far too weak to support  the argument  for taxing 
estimated  accruals.  To this I shall  return  below. 
In their  present  paper,  just before  summarizing  their  conclusions,  Shoven 
and  Bulow  seem  to me to have  come  around  to the view  that some  of these 
complications  seriously  damage  their position, though their conclusions 
remain  essentially  unaffected.  To be specific,  from their estimated  profit 
adjustments  they  omit the value  accruals  (positive  or negative)  on physical 
capital and land other than current  replacements,  because  the required 
data  are  not available.  Pragmatically,  this amounts  to keeping  their  hands 
off the unmanageable  valuation  difficulties  I have discussed  above. Since 
the authors  cannot  do what their conception  suggests  "should"  be done, 
what remains  in their collection  of reforms  concerning  the taxation of 
unrealized  accruals? 
Various  items  representing  unrealized  accruals  do remain  on the list; the 
one of dominant  significance  for 1973  and 1974  is the diminution  of the real 
value  of the liabilities  of enterprises.  The  very  large  size of this item  results 
in good part from  the Shoven-Bulow  postulate  that if an enterprise  could 
have repurchased  its bonds  at a reduced  price  but did not in fact do so, its 
taxable  profits  should  nevertheless  be defined  to include  that reduction  in 
value.  This peculiar  candidate  for additional  taxation  looms large in the 
authors'  list, after  de facto exclusion  of the unmanageable  item that logi- 
cally comes first, the value accruals  (positive or negative)  on plant and 
equipment  and on land. Recognition  that these  latter  accruals  pose an in- 
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they subsequently repeat their advocacy of the taxation of unrealized ac- 
cruals. 
Prior to expressing their conclusions they make another essential con- 
cession, even if it is not meant to be one. They ask why the valuation of 
shares in the stock exchange did not reflect the profit trend for the years 
following 1972, which is a very favorable trend if the reported profits are 
adjusted by their method. Their discussion of this question, while deliber- 
ately and quite rightly sketchy, includes points that I have made both at 
this and at the last panel meeting, when arguing that estimated unrealized 
gains should not be included in the tax base unless the wish is to force 
realization. What the authors do clearly recognize is the inability of enter- 
prises to raise funds on conditions implying the high profitability estimated 
in the paper. 
By way of summary, I suggest, first, that neither Shoven and Bulow nor 
anyone else can find acceptable estimates for determining  the tax base their 
preferred  way, with the result that they cannot help being highly selective 
in applying their principle. Second, in either a general or a selective appli- 
cation of their position, it is quite unclear what decisionmaking processes 
are to be guided by their favored concept of profits, which they try to justify 
merely by relating it to the vague term "economic power." Third, while no 
single operational concept of profit seems particularly  relevant to the firm's 
decisionmaking  processes, the authors argue for including a major item that 
would seem to me an implausible candidate even if I could put aside gen- 
eral misgivings about the accrual principle. This item is the alleged gain 
accruing to a firm that has two characteristics: (a) the market value of its 
outstanding bonds has declined because interest rates have risen; (b) the 
firm has, however, not repurchased its bonds in these circumstances-that 
is, in markets in which new bonds could be issued only at correspondingly 
higher interest rates. 
Since time has forced me to concentrate on points of disagreement, I 
wish to conclude by repeating that dissent must not be allowed to obscure 
the appreciation of very careful and competent research on a controversial 
problem of great complexity. 
Edward  M. Gramlich: This paper, like the first Shoven-Bulow work, is a 
complete and well-developed discussion of the accounting and tax conven- 
tions appropriate  for defining business income in an inflationary world. As 
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important problem, and vast mistakes, or at least misleading inferences, 
can be made if business and corporate income are not correctly defined. 
The interesting  analytical issue, in this and the first Shoven-Bulow paper, 
is the distinction between the Haig-Simons purchasing-power-accrual  defi- 
nition of income and the Pigou capital-maintenance  concept. Before, in the 
treatment of nonfinancial assets, this issue came up in the appropriate  defi- 
nition of inventory and capital costs when goods prices were not all rising 
at the same rate: was a firm that was holding inventories whose prices in- 
creased at extraordinary  rates better off because of its implicit capital gain, 
or no better off because this gain reflected  nothing more than higher inven- 
tory bills from then on? The purchasing-power-accrual  concept would in- 
clude the capital gain in profits (that is what Shoven and Bulow mean by 
constant-dollar  FIFO), while the capital-maintenance  concept would simply 
ignore the real gains on inventories by using the present optional LIFO 
convention. As I argued in my comment on the first Shoven-Bulow paper, 
a tentative answer is that it depends on the substitution possibilities open 
to the firm. If the firm did not have to buy the appreciated inventories, it 
was in some sense better off and the one-shot capital gains reflecting that 
fact should be included in firm income. If it did have to, these one-shot 
gains would in effect never be realized and should never be counted as 
profits. 
A similar issue arises in the case of financial assets and liabilities. If the 
interest rate facing one firm should rise, its outstanding debt will depreciate 
in market value and the firm will experience a one-shot capital gain. If the 
debt is not a consol, that gain will be offset by future losses as the bond 
approaches its par value at maturity. The question then is whether the one- 
shot gain on outstanding debt should show as a profit in the year it occurs, 
to  be  offset by succeeding losses  as the debt matures. The purchasing- 
power-accrual concept dictates the answer "yes"; the capital-maintenance 
concept, "no"; and an intermediate concept suggested by James Tobin at 
the last meeting of the Brookings panel, whereby all gains or losses are 
converted to their annuity-value income, suggests "partly." Again, I think 
the answer depends on whether the firm has to  go to the bond market 
for funds (that is, whether it has substitution possibilities). If it need not 
rely on debt finance, it can in some sense simply buy back the debt and is 
better off because of its gain. If it must rely on the bond market, it is not 
obviously better off. Fortunately, in this paper, unlike the last one, all gains 
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accrual definition or the capital-maintenance definition is simply one of 
timing. 
This issue of accrual  versus capital maintenance is the hard one raised in 
both Shoven-Bulow  papers and tends to receive the most ink and cause the 
most head-scratching. But the problem really has nothing to do with the 
general  price-inflation  accounting that motivated the Shoven-Bulow papers 
in the first place. Whether overall prices are stable, rising, or falling, there 
will always be shifts in relative prices and interest rates, and accounting 
conventions will have to record these shifts either on an accrual or a reali- 
zation basis. However this is done, it is obviously necessary  to deal with the 
accounting problems raised by general price inflation for depreciation, in- 
ventories, and financial assets and liabilities. Here, there is not much con- 
flict among Shoven and Bulow, their discussants, and at least the conven- 
tions proposed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board: all would 
make adjustments  in the various items affected by changing general prices. 
Over the five-year period 1970-74, these general price adjustments would 
have subtracted about $3 billion from corporate profits using the capital- 
maintenance approach or added about $4 billion using the highly volatile 
purchasing-power-accrual  approach.' 
Finally, the reforms advocated by Shoven and Bulow would be a big im- 
provement over present practice in inflationary  times. The misstatement of 
corporate income could cause random shifts in the distribution of income, 
cycles in interest rates and stock prices, and probably some retardation in 
the rate of capital formation because of both accounting illusion and tax 
effects. None of these outcomes seems particularly desirable, and hence it 
seems reasonable to undertake the Shoven-Bulow reforms, or at least to 
acquaint the accounting profession and capital markets with the distortions 
in income that general price inflation can cause. Most of the paper is de- 
voted to a discussion of the fancy purchasing-power-accrual  concept of in- 
come, but even the more simple-minded inflation-adjusted capital-main- 
tenance concept would be a long step in the right direction. 
General  Discussion 
As was the case with the discussion of the previous paper by Shoven and 
Bulow, on physical  assets,  many of the comments  by participants  related 
1. These  numbers  are the average  of values  in table 8. Averaging  is necessary  because 
the purchasing-power-accrual  values are so volatile, and obviously the choice of years 
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to the authors' preference for the purchasing-power-accrual  definition of 
income. Franco Modigliani agreed that accounting adjustments are needed 
to reflect the changing real value of outstanding debt. When the interest 
rate goes up in response to a rise in the rate of inflation, it just compensates 
the lender for his loss of purchasing power and offsets the gain to the bor- 
rower. However, if the interest rate rises subsequent to a firm's incurring 
debt to purchase a real asset, that firm clearly benefits because it can "sell" 
that extra value. According to Modigliani, a well-working stock market 
should be expected to reflect such gains accruing to firms. He pointed out, 
however, that the gains on net financial liabilities for nonfinancial corpo- 
rations were largely offset by losses from inventory and depreciation adjust- 
ments. Thus, as the authors noted, the improvement in adjusted after-tax 
profits resulted primarily from extraordinary gains on bonds and mort- 
gages, which accountants typically ignore because they are concerned about 
long-term sustainable profits. If investors have the same attitudes as ac- 
countants or if they focus on the accounting figures, they will not respond 
to short-term gains that cannot be maintained. 
Arthur Okun expressed  his reservations  about purchasing-power  accrual, 
particularly  about the inclusion in the income of borrowers of the reduction 
in the present value of their long-term liabilities. Whether a firm is made 
better off by an interest-induced  reduction in bond values depends on the 
structure of its liabilities, its long-term cash-flow plan, and, as Gramlich 
had stressed,  its substitution possibilities. In general,  firms  that expect to be 
bond sellers over the long run are made worse off by an adverse bond mar- 
ket. Okun conceded that those who had issued bonds prior to the rise in 
interest rates were less adversely affected than those who had planned to 
sell at a later date; but he did not believe that the income statement should 
be focused on that difference. 
William Poole asked Feilner to clarify his statement that some of what 
Shoven and Bulow treated as accrued gains were not in reality gains be- 
cause they could not be realized. Was he implying that, in a macroeconomic 
sense, liquidity problems would preclude simultaneous realization of every- 
one's accrued gains? Fellner stated that this was a problem but that, even 
for an individual or firm, it is not necessarily true that a gain on an asset 
can be realized by borrowing against it, because the valuation is highly 
uncertain. Poole did not accept this second argument, believing that the 
gain could be extracted in some form-for  example, through a merger 
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The distinction between the appropriate income definition for manage- 
ment and market information and that for tax purposes concerned Martin 
Feldstein. Whether or not accrued gains on financial assets and liabilities 
should be reported  to stockholders  as income, any proposal to include them 
in the tax base should recognize that accrual taxation is not the general 
rule. For example, other accrued gains-pension  saving, Keogh-plan sav- 
ing, gains on holding real and personal property-remain  untaxed. 
Turning to  another issue, Feldstein applied to  financial assets James 
Tobin's suggestion of converting extraordinary  gains and losses into their 
value as an annuity. In the case of a long-term bond, the inverse relation- 
ship between market value and interest rates means that the issuer cannot 
convert any decline in price into an altered annuity over the life of the bond. 
Old bonds can be bought back at a discount but new bonds have to carry a 
larger coupon. From that point of view, the gain cannot be translated into 
an incremental annuity and hence should not be viewed as income. 
Henry Aaron remarked that capital losses on pension funds should not 
necessarily  show up as adjustments to the profits of the firm. If total wage 
costs per worker remain the same, the workers will be adversely affected 
through a reduction in real wages. If profits, real wages, and output are 
maintained, the customer will be affected by higher product prices. Only 
when real wages, output, and prices are unchanged will the authors' adjust- 
ment be correct. Shoven replied that, while the long-run incidence of the 
loss was an important consideration, he was concerned about the present 
worth of the firm, which clearly was affected by the capital loss. Aaron 
pointed out that their approach would be correct only if the firm were liqui- 
dating. An ongoing firm would take steps to compensate for the capital 
loss,  such as reducing pensions, lowering money wages,  offering fewer 
fringe benefits, raising prices. Hence, the present value of the loss in profits 
would be less than the initial capital loss to the pension fund. 
Okun emphasized the unique situation of regulated public utilities. The 
authors correctly noted and qualified the large impact of American Tele- 
phone and Telegraph on aggregate adjusted profits for the Dow thirty. But 
they offered no measure of the impact of the adjustment for the whole 
public utilities sector on nonfinancial corporate profits. To the extent that 
pricing rules of public utility commissions are based on original cost, a 
utility's assets are monetized immediately; hence, increases in their value 
should not be treated as a gain to the stockholders. 
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He agreed  with  Feilner  that  household  incomes  also should  be adjusted  for 
inflation  and  thought  that government  tax receipts  are slightly  lower  than 
they  would  be with  uniform  adjustments.  Stressing  the need for adjusting 
corporate  income  even  though  firms  may  be faced  with  a large  tax bill in a 
year of extraordinary  accrued  gains,  he suggested  that the problem  could 
be solved  by introducing  long-term  income  averaging  into the tax laws.  On 
Feilner's  comment  that the estimated  value of an asset during an infla- 
tionary  period  would  be highly  uncertain,  Bulow  argued  that  it would  never- 
theless  be a better  estimate  of the asset's  true  value  than  original  cost  would 
be. Bulow  conjectured  that one reason  that  the stock  market  did not move 
with  the adjusted  profits  measure  of the paper  might  be that  financial  ana- 
lysts are  more  concerned  with  the recurring  inflation  adjustments,  such as 
those for inventories,  depreciation,  and the purchasing  power of net lia- 
bilities,  than  with  nonrecurring  adjustments,  such  as changes  in bond  prices. 